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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction lo rc\ iew I Ins appeal from the
judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah,
dated August 3,2004, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) (Supreme Court
authority to transfer case to Ct. of App.) and 78-2a-3(J) (jurisdiction over cases
transferred by Supreme Ct.).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following is a verbatim presentation of issues presented by Appellants
(hereafter, "Gedo") in Gedo's brief. Following each issue statement, Appellees
(hereafter, "Sudweeks") present the applicable standard of review.
ISSUE NO. 1. "Whether the trial court erred by allowing Appellees to commence
this action alleging 5 (five) causes of action, to wit:

(a) Boundary by acquiescence.
(b) Prescriptive easement.
(c) Trespass by Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo, and Maria Angelica Sanchez.
(d) Forcible detainer by David Gedo, James Gedo, and Maria Angelica Sanchez.
(e) Injunction;"
Standard of Review. As presented, this issue appears to suggest that the trial court
should not have permitted Appellees to file their complaint with five causes of action
related to ownership and control of real property in dispute. The statement thus presents
a threshold question of the Sudweeks' right of access to the court, and secondly, a
question of the trial court's discretion in dismissing claims.
Art. 1. § 11, Utah Constitution guarantees every person the right to a remedy by
due course of law. Constitutional challenges to the application of statues constitute
questions of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Colosmio v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646, 651 (Ut. App. 2004).
Dismissal of actions in the trial court is governed under Utah R. Civ. P. 41. A trial
court's decision as to dismissal of claims for either lack of standing, jurisdiction or
content, as broadly articulated in Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), is subjected to a de novo review
on appeal.
This issue was not preserved in the trial court, Gedo filed an answer to the subject
complaint on June 4, 2001 wherein Gedo denied the "substantial allegations" and
thereafter alleged counter-suit on a variety of claims including attempted theft,
conspiracy, assault and impersonation of an officer. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5)
ISSUE NO. 2. "Whether the trial court erred when Appellant challenged the
jurisdiction of the court and made special appearance only to present official muniments
of ownership sufficient to raise the issues of:

(a) Show there were no issues of title, or quiet title or boundary by acquiescence or
prescriptive easement or trespass or forcible detainer or any other cause of action within
the jurisdiction of the court relating to this case.
(b) Show that Appellees allegations and claims against Appellant failed to be
factually and legally sufficient to show justiciability of the issues between them and the
subject parcel to this action.
(c) Show lack of sufficient personal interest on the part of Appellees to confer
standing to prosecute any claim against these Appellants.
(d) Show the absence of any private right of action in favor of Appellees.
(e) Show a proper basis for Appellees to accuse Appellant for contempt of the
court and impose summary incarceration of Appellants due to non-adjudicated claim that
Appellants committed crime against Appellees as a contempt of the trial court.
(f) Show that Appellees allegations and claims against Appellant were factually
and legally insufficient to show that Appellants had violated mandatory state law
governing the protection of, ownership of, use of and possession of private real estate."
Standard of Review. As presented, this issue implies the improper exercise of
jurisdiction; either subject matter or personal. Questions as to whether a court has subject
matter jurisdiction are questions of law which the Court reviews for correctness,
according no deference to the trial court's determination. Beaver County v. Quest, Inc.,
31 P.3d 1147, 1149 (UT 2001)
According to trial court documents filed and in the Sudweeks' possession, this
issue was not preserved in the trial court. No limited or special appearance was provided
to the Sudweeks counsel. Gedo filed an answer to the Sudweeks complaint on June 4,
2001.
ISSUE NO. 3. "Whether the trial court erred by failing to properly consider
Appellants timely Notice that the principles of laches precludes Appellee from bringing
this action due to Appellees unreasonable delay and negligence in pursuing Appellees
claim."
Standard of Review. This issue, as presented, appears to raise either a question of
fact as to whether an affirmative defense was timely asserted, or a question of law as

whether the trial court properly applied the law to facts presented. Questions of fact are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference given to the trial court. Platts
v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997). The trial court's application of
law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. Actions or events relating to
waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which
the appellate court gives a district court deference. Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572
(UT 1999).
This issue was not preserved in the trial court. Sudweeks can find no presentation
of an affirmative defense by Gedo. Gedo answered Sudweeks' complaint on June 4,
2001. Said answer contained no affirmative defenses or mention of "laches" but rather,
requested a trial setting at the soonest possible date. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5)
ISSUE NO. 4. "Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants' motion to
dismiss and denied Appellant's request for declaratory judgment and summary judgment
against Appellee based upon Appellants officially recorded muniments of ownership, and
records of tax payments and presumptions of possession and ownership according to
Utah Code and based upon Appellants official survey plat map, all of which are
redundantly dispositive of Appellees claims against Appellants."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue raises a question of law with regard to a
motion to dismiss, as well as issues of law related to summary judgment. A trial court's
ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, with no
deference to the district court's ruling. State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). No appeal lies from denial of summary judgment (Utah R. Civ. P. rule 56)
however, a court's denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, with no

deference to the trial court's determinations. Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116
P.3d323,331(UT2005).
This issue was not specifically preserved in the trial court by any filing or written
objection to the court's order. Moreover, no motions matching the description provided
were supplied to Sudweeks, and neither are believed to be part of any court proceeding in
this matter.
ISSUE NO. 5. "Whether the trial court erred by allowing Appellees (sic) attorney
to fail to respond to many official documents and issues properly interjected by Appellant
into this case and which established justiciable issues and requests for the court to rule
upon."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to present a question as to the
trial court's conduct and handling of discovery, hearings and other aspects of litigation—
and papers which may or may not have been properly presented by Gedo in the process.
A trial court judge's rulings related to management of a case are not disturbed unless they
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the objecting party. Hanks v.
Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960).
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by any filing in Sudweeks'
possession, nor do Sudweeks possess any document to which the "issue" might refer.
ISSUE NO. 6. "Whether the trial court Judge Hansen erred by issuing a
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, when and while the court
failed to require Appellee to provide the court with verifiable articulable probable cause
in support of Appellees (sic) motion for temporary restraining order."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue raises the question of the trial court
judge's ruling on facts presented in favor of injunctive relief. On appellate review, a
grant of injunction is overturned only upon showing that the district court abused its

discretion or that the decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence. Strawberry
Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (UT 1996).
This issue is believed to have been preserved in the trial court inasmuch as the
issue of injunctive relief for the Sudweeks was presented to the trial court, with an
opportunity for ruling. 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (UT 2004).
ISSUE NO. 7. "Whether the Court erred by committing unlawful actions of
issuing an injunction when and while Appellee failed to show then and now can not show
any proper evidence of ownership."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to question the trial court's
ruling on a motion for injunctive relief. Rulings on injunction motions are reviewed for
abuse of discretion and will only be overturned if there is a showing that the district court
abused its discretion or that the decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence.
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (UT 1996).
This issue was preserved in the trial court inasmuch as the issue of injunctive relief
for Sudweeks was presented to the trial court, with an opportunity for ruling. 438 Main
St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (UT 2004).
ISSUE NO. 8. "Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants (sic)
motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Appellees
when and while Appellants had then and have now all of the official muniments of
ownership pertaining to the subject parcel."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to question the trial court's
ruling on a motion for injunctive relief. Rulings on injunction motions are reviewed for
abuse of discretion and will only be overturned if there is a showing that the district court

abused its discretion or that the decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence.
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (UT 1996).
This issue is believed to have been preserved in the trial court inasmuch as the
issue of injunctive relief for Sudweeks was presented to the trial court, with an
opportunity for ruling. 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (UT 2004).
ISSUE NO. 9. "Whether the trial court erred when it allowed Appellees (sic)
attorney, Judge Taylor and the State of Utah Fourth District Court personnel tampering
with the State of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure process and the U.S. Postal Service
system, all of which resulted in numerous official failures to timely notify Appellant of
crucial, indispensable hearings, documents, litigation and other information pertinent to
this case, all of which are required by law to be noticed to Appellant affirmatively
throughout this action."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue suggests the judicial mishandling of
procedural requirements. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of
law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). A trial
court judge's rulings related to management of a case are not disturbed unless they are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the objecting party. Hanks v.
Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960).
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by any filing properly served upon
the Sudweeks.
ISSUES NO. 10. "Whether the trial court erred when on June 19, 2003, Appellee
scheduled pretrial conference ex parte for change of judge from Judge Hansen, Division 7
Civil, to Judge Taylor, Division 1 Criminal Felony in violation of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 63 A Change of judge as a matter of right."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue calls into question procedural matters
having to do with a change of the judge assigned in the trial court. The proper

interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness.
State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). A trial court judge's rulings related to
management of a case are not disturbed unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable
and prejudice the objecting party. Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960).
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by any document filed in the trial
court and in the possession of the Sudweeks.
ISSUE NO. 11. "Whether the trial court erred by conducting ex parte hearings
with Judge Taylor and Appellee, which resulted in (sic) summary deprivation of
Appellants (sic) civil rights by Appellee and Judge Taylor court."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue presents accusations of judicial
misconduct. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is
reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). A trial court
judge's rulings related to management of a case are not disturbed unless they are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the objecting party. Hanks v. Christensen, 354
P.2d 564 (UT 1960).
This issue was not preserved in any document filed and in the possession of the
Sudweeks.
ISSUE NO. 12. "Whether the trial court erred by allowing the complaint to be
materially changed by Appellee and the trial court ex parte."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue calls into question the matters of civil
procedure in the trial court's administration of the case. The proper interpretation of a
rule of procedure is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21
P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). A trial court judge's rulings related to management of a case

are not disturbed unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the
objecting party. Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960). Furthermore, whether to
grant or deny a motion to amend is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appealing party established an abuse of
discretion resulting in prejudice. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 82 P.3d 198
(Ut App. 2003).
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by any document filed with the court
and in the Sudweeks' possession.
ISSUE NO. 13. "Whether the reviewing judge erred by denying Appellants (sic)
motion for Change of Judge under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 63(b)."
Standard of Review. As stated this issue raises a question of judicial
administration of the case below. A trial court judge's rulings related to management of a
case are not disturbed unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the
objecting party. Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by virtue of Gedo filing a Request for
Change of Judge, thus presenting the issue for the court's consideration and ruling.
ISSUE NO. 14. "Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants (sic) timely
request for Jury Trial."
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of fact as to the timeliness of
the request for jury trial and a question of law as to the trial court's application of law to
facts. Questions of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference
given to the trial court. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997).
The trial court's application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.

This issue was not preserved in the trial court by virtue of Gedo making the
request and thus presenting the issue for the court's consideration and ruling.
ISSUE NO. 15. "Whether the trial court erred when it allowed the Appellee at trial
for this case, to enter into evidence, over appellant's instant, timely and proper objection,
an unofficial criminal simulation plat map and which that said objection immediately sent
Appellant to jail summarily."
Standard of Review. This issue, as stated, calls into question the trial court's
handling of evidence. The admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law
reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d
416, 425 (UT 2005); also, State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165 (UT 2003); State v. Whittle,
989P.2d52(UT1999).
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court by Gedo's filing of a
"Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction and Litigation Fees" wherein Gedo
challenged the authenticity and reliability of Sudweeks evidence and accused the trial
court of rejecting Gedo's proffer of evidence. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5)
ISSUE NO. 16. "Whether the trial court erred when it allowed presentation by
official surveyor John B. Stahl of an unrecorded plat map as evidence of Appellees
ownership of the subject parcel, and which said criminal simulation plat map has not to
this day been recorded at the Utah County Recorders office."
Standard of Review. This issue, as stated, appears to be redundant to the
previously-stated issue, and calls into question the trial court's handling of evidence. The
admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law reviewed on appeal under an
abuse of discretion standard. Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416, 425 (UT 2005); also, State
v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165 (UT 2003); State v. Whittle, 989 P.2d 52 (UT 1999).

This issue may have been preserved in the trial court by Gedo's filing of a
"Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction and Litigation Fees" wherein Gedo
challenged the authenticity and reliability of Sudweeks evidence and accused the trial
court of rejecting Gedo's proffer of evidence. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5)
ISSUE NO. 17. "Whether the trial court erred by dismissing at the conclusion of
trial all of Appellees (sic) original claims that were used by Appellee as justification for
the issuance under oath, of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and
(sic) quieted Appellants (sic) title to the parcel to Appellees."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue calls into question the substance of the
trial court's final legal conclusions and order. The trial court's factual findings are
reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Hilton, 121
P.3d 42, 46 (UT 2005); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (UT 1998).
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders —but it was not
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the
Gedo Docketing Statement.
ISSUE NO. 18. "Whether the trial court erred by failing in the final order to direct
Appellants to deliver the warranty deed or other documents to Appellee as required by
Utah Code, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70, Judgment for specific acts; vesting
title, and thereby properly resulting in nullification of all the court judgment and orders in
this case."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to raise questions as to the
sufficiency of the trial court's final order. A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for
clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Hilton, 121 P.3d 42, 46 (UT
2005); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (UT 1998).

This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders—but it was not
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the
Gedo Docketing Statement.
ISSUE NO. 19. "Whether the trial court erred by failing to require Appellees to
prepare the final order within the time limits of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5 8A.
(d) Entry, and Rule 5, Service."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to raise a question as to the trial
court's application of procedural rules and a question of fact as to timeliness of the final
order. Questions of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference
given to the trial court. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997).
The trial court's application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. The
proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001).
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders—but it was not
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the
Gedo Docketing Statement.
ISSUE NO. 20. "Whether the trial court erred when months after trial and without
proper notice to Appellant, Judge Taylor peremptorily signed and mailed copy of the
final order in this case to (sic) Appellants several year old officially superceded address
in a blatant attempt to deprive Appellants of their right of appeal, and post judgment
remedies."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to raise a question as to the trial
court's application of procedural rules and a question of fact as to timeliness of the

signing and mailing of the final order. Questions of fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard, with deference given to the trial court. Platts v. Parents Helping
Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997). The trial court's application of law to the facts is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a
question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App.
2001).
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders—but it was not
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the
Gedo Docketing Statement.
ISSUE NO. 21. "Whether the Court erred when, as shown by Court records, the
court (sic) failed to send Appellant copy of the final order in violation of Appellants right
to due process, notice and opportunity to defend with post judgment remedies and to
legally challenge the trial court final orders in this case."
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue raises a question of civil procedure postjudgment. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is
reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). Questions of fact
as to the timeliness of mailing or circumstances surrounding that process would be
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference given to the trial court. Platts
v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997).
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders—but it was not
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the
Gedo Docketing Statement.

ISSUE NO. 22. "Whether the court erred by denying Appellant the protection of
the due process clauses included in all three of the United States of America Constitution,
the State of Utah Constitution and the Utah Code Annotated Rules of Civil Procedure and
other holdings in the Utah Code, and all of which are specifically constructed to insure,
simplify and expedite the resolution of frivolous lawsuits from escalation from one 15
(fifteen) minute pretrial hearing to a case that has lasted 4 (four) years wherein
Appellants have been subjected to involuntary servitude of being deprived of officially
recorded real property and forced to litigate against professional attorneys without the
assistance of counsel to protect and defend their officially owned realty, and continues to
this very day."
Standard of Review. As stated by Gedo, this issue implies a question of due
process violations arising from the redundant challenge to the trial court's management of
the case below. Constitutional challenges to the application of statues constitute questions
of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Colosmio v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646, 651 (Ut. App. 2004). The proper interpretation
of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry,
21P.3d675(Ut.App.2001).
This issue was not specifically preserved in the trial court by any document filed
with the court and in the Sudweeks' possession. It is noted, however, that among the
allegations raised in Gedo's "Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction and
Litigation Fees" and Gedo's "Request to Change Judge" are references to the deprivation
of Constitutional rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
The full text of cited provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations is included in
Exhibit "A" of the Addendum hereto.
1.

United States Constitution, 1st Amendment (right to petition for redress)

2.

United States Constitution, 14 Amendment (due process)

3.

Utah Constitution, Art. 1. § 11 (right to a remedy by due course of law)

4.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

5(d)
10(f)
12(b)
38(b) and (d)
63(b)(c)(2)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

Gedo has appealed a final order entitled "Order and Judgment" filed August 3,
2004 in the Fourth District Court in and for Utah County by Judge James R. Taylor.
The case arises from conflicting claims of ownership of a 33' wide strip of land
running South and away from 200 South Street (Battle Creek Drive) in Pleasant Grove,
Utah at approximately 1610 East (the "disputed property"). The disputed property was
part of the Sudweeks property description when they purchased two adjoining lots at 200
South, 1610 East, Pleasant Grove, Utah in 1972. From the time of their purchase, the
Sudweeks treated the land in all respects as belonging to them by landscaping, improving
and using the land—as well as paying taxes assessed for the land. The conflict with
Gedo (Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Sanchez) began in the spring of 2001,
29 years after the Sudweeks' purchase.
Sometime after 1999, Gedo began to occasionally use the strip of land to access
property Gedo had purchased South and East of the Sudweeks property. Noting the Gedo

intrusion, Sudweeks filed an action May 10, 2001 in the Fourth District Court in Provo,
Utah, seeking to quiet title to the 33' strip of property. Summons and complaint were
served upon Gedo May 18, 2001 and a hand-written answer to the complaint was filed
June 4, 2001.
In reaction to the Sudweeks complaint, Gedo parked a wrecking truck directly in
front of Sudweeks' motor home which was parked on the strip of land. The positioning
of Gedo's wrecking truck preventing use or movement of the motor home. On or about
July 2, 2001, James and Miguel Gedo threatened John Sudweeks' health and safety and
that of his wife and family. A temporary restraining order was issued and then, after a
hearing on the matter, in which the Gedo defendants were present and heard, Judge
Hansen subsequently converted the TRO to a Preliminary Injunction against David and
James Gedo.
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below
By motion the Sudweeks were permitted to amend their complaint in 2003 to add
causes of action for boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement.
Trial took place December 15 and 16, 2003. During opening statements, David
Gedo ignored the court's repeated direction to be quiet and wait his turn and was
eventually found in contempt and temporarily incarcerated. He was then permitted to reenter the court room to continue the trial, on his promise to be quiet and wait his turn.
All the evidence relied upon in the Court's findings and ruling was presented after all
Defendants were again present in the court, with opportunity to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

In its final Order and Judgment entered August 3,2004, the trial court found that
based on the evidence presented by Sudweeks and their witnesses, the 33' wide strip of
land did not validly exist and the county maps indicating its existence were in error. The
Court found that a mistaken description in a neighboring lot, made years earlier, had been
propagated into descriptions for the Sudweeks' lots, resulting in a gap 33' wide that the
Utah County Recorder's office had shown, at various times, in various places on maps.
With chain of title research on all affected lots, and a comprehensive survey of the
same, a corrected property description was drafted which, when compared to existing,
historic fence lines and markers, exactly fit those indicia for the two lots purchased by
Sudweeks in 1972, and for each of the neighboring lots as well.
Based on these findings, the court quieted title to the disputed 33' wide parcel in
Sudweeks. The court then dismissed alternative claims by Sudweeks for boundary by
acquiescence and prescriptive easement as unnecessary or moot. By Sudweeks' own
motion, the court then dismissed the forcible detainer action. Finally, finding that Gedo
claimed rightful use of the disputed parcel, the court dismissed Sudweeks' trespass claim.
The court then proceeded to find that Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo had
violated the Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction entered by the
court in September 2001 by placing threatening telephone calls to Sudweeks on or about
June 24 and June 26, 2003. The court therefore found David and James Gedo in
contempt and granted Sudweeks a permanent injunction, restraining Gedo from using,
occupying or trespassing on the Sudweeks' property, including the disputed parcel, and
from having any contact with Sudweeks or Sudweeks' family members, and then

awarded attorney fees and costs of $14,182.70 to be paid by the two Defendants found in
contempt.
Prior to the trial court signing its final order, Gedo had filed a notice of appeal
January 9, 2004 and then an attempted "Docketing Statement" on March 19, 2004 and a
transcript request April 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals, on a sua sponte Motion for
Summary Disposition filed April 2, 2004, called for memoranda from Gedo and
Sudweeks as to whether or not the Gedo appeal filed January 9, 2004 should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals declined to exercise jurisdiction and
dismissed the first Gedo appeal June 17, 2004.
Upon presentation of an affidavit of attorney fees and costs to the trial court, the
trial court, Judge James Taylor, entered Order and Judgment as a final order in the case
on August 3, 2004. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is noted that Rule 24, Utah R. App. P. requires as part of the Statement of Facts,
references to proceedings below as cited in the record of the case. As the appellate court
record shows, Gedo first failed to request a transcript under Rule 11, Ut. R. App. P., and
then failed to submit a statement of evidence as required under Rule 11(g), Ut. R. App. P.
Since no record is available from the trial court, the parties are left to provide a "record"
based on filings in the trial court. These material documents are included herein as
exhibits in the Addendum.

1.

The disputed property is a 33' wide strip of property located on the Eastern

edge of Sudweeks' property in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (Amended Complaint, ^fl[ 3-9,
Exhibit "B", Addendum.)
2.

Gedo consists of three individuals (Maria Angelica Sanchez, Migel David

Gedo and James Gedo) residing in Utah County, Utah. (Complaint, Tf 2, Exhibit "C",
Addendum.)
3.

Sudweeks consists of two individuals (John and Deanna Sudweeks) who

are husband and wife, residing at 1610 East 200 South, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062.
(Complaint, ^ 1, Exhibit "C", Addendum.)
4.

Sudweeks own two adjoining parcels of real property in Pleasant Grove

City, Utah County, State of Utah, one parcel which is described in the Warranty Deed
from Joseph Best and Elainne P. Best to Plaintiffs, dated June 21, 1972, and recorded
June 22, 1972 as Entry No. 9195, Book 1279 and Page 224 of the Records of the Utah
County Recorder's Office and the second parcel which is described in the Warranty Deed
from Boyd M. Collings and Geraldine L. Collings to Sudweeks, dated August 25, 1972 as
Entry No. 13361, Book 1290 and page 108 of the Records of the Utah County Recorder's
Office. (Amended Complaint, pp. 1-2, f3; Exhibit "B", Addendum; Lots 5d and 5b, Stahl
survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Exhibit "O", Addendum.)
5.

Sudweeks have been the sole and exclusive owners of the above described

parcels since they purchased the same in 1972. (Amended Complaint, pg.2, %4; Exhibit
"B", Exhibit "O", Addendum.)

6.

Johnny Ray O'Conner and Martha O'Conner are the owners of a parcel of

real property in Pleasant Grove City, County of Utah , State of Utah ("O'Conner
Property") which is located directly to the East of Sudweeks' parcels, as referred to in the
Warranty Deed from Susan S. Hardinger to the O'Conners dated August 10, 1994 as
Entry No. 64616, Book 3507 and Pages 855 and 856 of the Records of the Utah County
Recorder's Office. (Amended Complaint, pg.2, ^[5; Exhibit "B", Addendum; Lot 2b,
Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D", O'Conner Deed, Exhibit "P", Addendum.)
7.

Gedo claims an ownership interest in real property in Pleasant Grove City

which is described in the Quit Claim Deed from Miguel David Gedo to Maria Angelica
Sanchez dated October 8, 2000 and recorded October 19, 2000 as Entry No. 112433,
Book 5248 and Pages 654-656 of the Records of the Utah County Recorder's Office.
(Amended Complaint, pg.2, ^|6; Exhibit "B", Addendum; Lot 59, 1978 Utah County Plat,
NW-NE section 27, township 5 south, range 2 east #14044, 2 of 4, Exhibit "E", Gedo
Deeds, Exhibit "G", Addendum)
8.

In 1972 the decree of distribution for the estate of Ivadell Tomlinson

mistakenly located the east line of certain real property in the Tomlinson estate (including
the Sudweeks property; see lots 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d, Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D",
Addendum) westward 33 feet from its correct position. (Order and Judgment, pg.2, TJ2;
Exhibit "F", Addendum; Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Addendum.)
9.

The Tomlinson estate was subsequently divided into four parcels; lot 5b

(the eastern most parcel owned by Sudweeks), lot 5d (Sudweeks west parcel), lot 5a
(adjacent and west of Sudweeks), and lot 5c (adjacent and west of 5a). The legal

descriptions of the lots perpetuated the error previously described, shifting the legal
descriptions of each of these properties westward 33 feet. (Order and Judgment, pg.2, ^|4;
Exhibit "F", Addendum; Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Addendum.)
10.

Modifications were subsequently made to the descriptions of parcels on

either side of the Tomlinson estate properties (lot 3 and lots 2a, 2b, and 2c, Stahl
survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Addendum.)
11.

These modifications arose from boundary line agreements, surveys and

deed exchanges. (Order and Judgment, pg.3, ^[6; Exhibit "F", Addendum; Stahl
survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Addendum.)
12.

Even though the boundaries between the Sudweeks' eastern most parcel

(lot 5b, Stahl Survey, lot 16 on Utah County plat, Exhibit "E", Addendum) and
O'Conners (lot 2b, Stahl Survey, lot 57 , Utah County Plat, Exhibit "E", Addendum) are
contiguous, the modifications previously described purported to create a new parcel 33
feet wide between those two lots. This purported parcel ("disputed property") was
referred to as lot 59 in the records of the Utah County Recorder. (Order and Judgment,
pg.3, f7; Exhibit "F", Addendum; Utah County Plat, Exhibit "E", Addendum.)
13.

As a function of the confusion caused by the errant descriptions, the "gap"

lot was shown at differrent locations at different times, as a comparison of sequential
county plat maps indicate. (Other County Maps, Exhibit "Q", Addendum.)
14.

The boundary between the O'Conner property and the disputed property is

marked by a fence and driveway, both of which have been in existence for a long time,

the fence having been constructed by Sudweeks shortly after Sudweeks' purchase of their
parcels in 1972. (Amended Complaint, pg.3, ^[9; Exhibit "B", Addendum.)
15.

The corresponding boundary line which is marked by the fence and

driveway has been recognized and treated by the parties and their predecessors in interest
as the Sudweeks' East boundary since 1972 when the Sudweeks purchased their two
parcels. (Amended Complaint, pg.3, ^flO; Exhibit "B", Addendum.)
16.

Sudweeks reasonably believed that their property line extended up to the

fence and driveway line since they purchased their parcels in 1972, and they have
continued to use and occupy the same since that time, and have planted fruit trees, grass,
plants, and have laid an asphalt pad on the same. (Amended Complaint, pg.3, ^|11;
Exhibit "B", Addendum.)
17.

In 1999 Gedo allegedly purchased the 33' wide parcel appearing as lot 59

on the Utah County Plat by warranty deed from Alan Strasburg. (Exhibit "G",
Addendum)
18.

Sudweeks filed an action May 10, 2001 in the Fourth District Court in

Provo, Utah, seeking to quiet title to the 33' strip of property. (Complaint, Exhibit "C",
Addendum.)
19.

Summons and complaint were served upon Gedo May 18, 2001 (Exhibit

"H", (Summons) Addendum) and a hand-written answer to the complaint was filed June
4, 2001. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5)
20.

Some time prior to July 2001, Gedo knowingly and intentionally drove a

wrecking truck upon and did park the same on the Sudweeks' property directly in front of

Plaintiffs motor home, and between it and the street—thereby depriving Sudweeks of the
use of their motor home. (Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, pg.2,
T[5; Exhibit "I", Addendum.)
21.

Gedo refused to remove the truck when repeatedly requested by Sudweeks,

claiming title to the disputed property. (Amended Complaint, pg.3, ^|14; Exhibit "B",
Addendum.)
22.

On or about July 2, 2001 David and James Gedo approached John

Sudweeks on his property and threatened his health and safety and that of his wife and
family. (Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, pg.2, ^J4; Exhibit "I",
Addendum.)
23.

Sudweeks was granted a Temporary Restraining Order which was

converted to a Preliminary Injunction after hearing before Judge Hansen, Fourth District
Court, August 8, 2001. (Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit "J", Addendum.)
24.

On or about June 24, 2003 and June 26, 2003, David and James Gedo

violated the Temporary Restraining Order by placing threatening telephone calls to
Sudweeks. (Order and Judgment, p.5, ^|16, Exhibit "F", Addendum.)
25.

Trial was held in the Fourth District Court on December 15th and 16th, 2003

before Judge James R. Taylor. (Order and Judgment, p.l, Exhibit "F", Addendum.)
26.

A final Order and Judgment was entered by Judge Taylor August 3, 2004,

wherein he quieted title in the disputed property to Sudweeks, found David and James
Gedo in contempt for violating the restraining order, granted a permanent injunction
against Gedos and then awarded attorney fees and costs to be paid by David Gedo and

James Gedo in the amount of $14,182.70. (Order and Judgment, p.l, Exhibit "F",
Addendum.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

GEDO FAILED TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED
ON APPEAL.

While the Gedo brief a constant barrage of sometimes-indecipherable jabs at the
trial court's factual findings and even the court itself, Gedo ducks the essential appellant
obligation to: 1) marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings, and then, 2)
show that it is insufficient to support or justify the trial court's ruling. This Court and the
Utah Supreme Court have firmly held that a failure to properly marshal evidence results
in the appellate court accepting the appellee's factual statements as true.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY QUIETED TITLE IN
SUDWEEKS.

The trial court properly quieted title in Sudweeks based upon the only credible
evidence presented at trial. Sudweeks' expert, John Stahl provided an authoritative,
logical explanation for the conflicts in property descriptions for the disputed property and
nearby lots, and offered the only appropriate solution.
Utah's notice statute for recorded documents (UCA § 57-3-102) negates Gedo's
claim of ownership. One who deals with real property is charged with notice of what is
shown or now shown on the county records, and by implication is charged with notice of
what the county records did not show, i.e., a lack of record title in his grantor.
Sudweeks had no notice from the public record of any error in the description of
their property. The mistake in Sudweeks' boundary description was the offspring of a

description error that occurred in property two parcels away from the Sudweeks, and
before the Sudweeks' parcels were created by subdivision. Thus, the error was
perpetuated consistently in the subdivided parcels and would not be distinguishable in the
Sudweeks chain of title. Indeed, it could not be discovered without a comprehensive
survey and title search on all neighboring properties, which was performed by John B.
Stahl, a licensed Utah Surveyor.
Gedo's deed was recorded almost 30 years after the Sudweeks deed to the same
property. Hence, under Utah's notice statute, Gedo had notice of flaws in title. Such
notice imposed the duty to investigate, which would have shown that Gedo had no valid
claim of ownership because there was no deed in the chain of title that created the parcel
Gedo claims to own. In essence, Gedo's deed was void for want of a grantor.
III.

GEDO'S CLAIMS OF PROCEDURAL ERRORS ARE WITHOUT
MERIT.

Gedo's various allegations of procedural impropriety in the trial court are
unfounded under the rules of civil procedure. The Gedo brief repeatedly alleges that the
trial court acted improperly—seemingly in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In each act or omission alleged, documents on file with the trial court show that
any dissatisfaction was the result of Gedo's misunderstanding of the appropriate
procedure or Gedo's own misapplication of the rules. In no case can it be said that the
court acted inappropriately or that Gedo was prejudiced by a procedural error of the
court.

IV.

GEDO'S CLAIMS OF CONSPIRACY AND EX PARTE
COMMUNICATION ARE UNDERMINED BY FACTS IN THE
RECORD.

Gedo's accusations of conspiracy, ex parte communication and other illegal or
improper conduct by the court and counsel, (and the purported deprivation of
fundamental rights as a result) are wholly unsupported and are undermined by the
pleadings on file.
The only evidence of ex parte communication in the entire case is the court's
rejection of an attempt by Gedo to communicate with Judge Hansen ex parte. Similarly,
the many references by Gedo to mailing errors by the trial court ignore the central duty of
litigants to supply the court with a current address. In any event, since Gedo was present
at every hearing; and was never denied a motion or defaulted for failure to appear or
respond, if there was any error in mailing, it was harmless.
V.

ATTORNEYS FEES WERE PROPERLY AWARDED AGAINST
TWO DEFENDANTS IN LIGHT OF THE COURT'S CONTEMPT
FINDING AGAINST THOSE DEFENDANTS UNDER THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.

The trial court properly awarded attorney fees and costs as a sanction against
James and David Gedo for their violation of a Temporary Restraining Order. A
Temporary Restraining Order was first issued by Judge Hansen upon evidence that those
two individuals had approached Mr. Sudweeks on his property, holding a breaker bar in
hand, where they made threats against his health and safety, and that of his wife and
family.

At trial, evidence was presented which confirmed that these same two individuals
subsequently placed threatening phone calls on two different days, to Sudweeks' home,
again threatening Mr. Sudweeks and his wife and family with physical violence.
An award of attorney fees is wholly appropriate as a contempt sanction for
violation of a court order. Unless limited by statute or constitutional provisions, the
extent of punishment for contempt is discretionary with the court. Thus, the trial court
has a considerable amount of discretion, and absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial
court's order should stand.
ARGUMENT
L

GEDO FAILED TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED
ON APPEAL.

The Gedo brief makes repeated but oft-times indecipherable allegations regarding
the trial court's factual findings and even the court itself. In the process of doing so,
Gedo ignores the essential appellant obligation to first, marshal every scrap of evidence
in support of the trial court's findings, and secondly, to then show that it is insufficient,
legally, to support or justify the trial court's ruling.
A.

Even a Pro Se Appellant Cannot Avoid the Marshaling Requirement.

Even in light of Gedo's pro se appearance, and even acknowledging Supreme
Court cautions that a layman acting as his own attorney should be indulged, (see Nelson
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (UT 1983)) the duty of any appellant to present all
competent evidence supporting the court's findings cannot be disregarded completely. In
2002 this very Court stressed the point that,

. . . in order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap
of competent evidence introduced at trial which support the very findings
the appellant resists.
Neelv v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 728 (UT 2002) (emphasis omitted). The Utah Supreme
Court explained the requirement further, in Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (UT 2004),
when it declared:
The challenging party must 'temporarily remove its own prejudices and
fully embrace the adversary's position'; he or she must play the 'devil's
advocate.' . . . Furthermore, appellants cannot shift the burden of
marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in support of the
trial court's findings. This would inappropriately force an appellee to
marshal the evidence in order to refute an appellant's assertion of the
absence of evidence.
Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (UT 2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Finally, the Supreme Court explains the purpose of the strict marshaling requirement:
. . . to promote two interrelated court objectives: efficiency and fairness,
.[a] proper marshaling of the evidence promotes efficiency by avoiding
'retrying the facts' and by assisting the appellate court in its 'decisionmaking and opinion writing.' It promotes fairness by requiring that the
appellants bear the expense and time of marshaling the evidence rather than
putting the appellee in the 'precarious position' of performing the
appellant's work at 'considerable time and expense.'. . . If the marshaling
requirement is not met, the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's
findings on that basis alone. If appellants have failed to properly marshal
the evidence, we assume that the evidence supports the trial court's
findings.
Id. at 1195-1196 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Sudweeks respectfully assert that they have already been required to shoulder an
unfair burden in this appeal as they have been forced to compensate for the lack of a
coherent docketing statement or brief, and undertake the research to identify issues and

then present standards of review. That having been said, they acknowledge the necessity
of responding to the Gedo brief in order to promote the second purpose stated for the
marshaling requirement: "assisting the appellate court in its 'decision-making and
opinion writing." Chen at 1196.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY QUIETED TITLE IN THE
SUDWEEKS.

The Trial Court properly quieted title in Sudweeks based upon credible evidence
presented at trial by Sudweeks' expert, John Stahl, who explained the source of
conflicting ownership claims.
A.

Sudweeks Presented Credible, Authoritative Evidence at Trial Regarding
Correct Boundary Lines and Ownership of the Disputed Property.

Evidence presented at trial by Sudweeks' expert witness, Mr. John Stahl, a
licensed Utah surveyor, provided an authoritative, logical explanation for the conflicting
claims of ownership in this case, and suggested the appropriate solution. Relating his
research and findings, Mr. Stahl offered a comprehensive survey and comparison of
historic property descriptions for real property parcels surrounding and including those
claimed by Sudweeks and Gedo. Because a transcript is not available, Mr. Stahl's
testimony is summarized briefly below.
Mr. Stahl's research proved that in 1972, a decree of distribution of the estate of
Ivadell Tomlinson (which estate included the property now owned by Sudweeks)
contained an erroneous legal description that mistakenly moved the east line of parcel 3
(Stahl Survey), which adjoined the Tomlinson property, westward 33 feet from its correct
position. The error also changed the location of the deed "tie" from the North Quarter

Corner to the Northeast Corner of Section 27 (see Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D",
Addendum.)
The errant description properly determined the amount of frontage available
between the two properties located on either side of the Tomlinson property; parcel 2
(property east of the Tomlinson estate) and parcel 3 (property west of the Tomlinson
estate). However the description for the Tomlinson property overlapped parcel 3 (west)
by 33 feet and also resulted in a gap between the Tomlinson property eastern line and the
west line of parcel 2 (property east of the Tomlinson property, now owned by O'Conner).
Mr. Stahl's title research, as explained to the trial court, showed that the
subsequent division of the Tomlinson property into four sub-parcels (parcels 5a, 5b, 5c
and 5d on Stahl survey, Exhibit "D", Addendum) perpetuated the same description error
as was contained in the original decree of distribution.
The error was also propagated into the adjoining descriptions for parcels 3 and 4
(property west of the Tomlinson property) and parcel 2 (property east of the Tomlinson
property) as they were modified to agree with the mistaken position of Parcel 5. Indeed,
Stahl's research showed that with the mistaken shift in boundaries, some interim
descriptions showed the west line of parcel 4 pushed 33 feet out into the middle of 1500
East Street.
East of what was the Tomlinson property, following the inadvertent boundary shift
to the west, the Utah County Assessor's records began to reflect the existence of a new
parcel occupying the space between parcel 2b (O'Conner) and 5b (Sudweeks). Mr. Stahl
showed that by proper description, the boundaries of these parcels are contiguous and no

property exists in that location. The Utah County Assessor's maps were thus shown to be
in error as the several maps could not decide where the "ghost" parcel should be placed,
(See Exhibit "Q", Addendum) and showed the parcels between the O'Conner's property
and 1500 East Street in the westward-shifted position, based upon the improper location
of the Tomlinson property (parcel 5 in Stahl survey) in the distribution decree.
Based upon his findings, and referencing documentation presented as evidence to
the trial court, (aerial photographic overlay, deeds/chains of title for all lots, survey) Mr.
Stahl testified that the proper solution to the problem is to record and map corrected
descriptions for each of the affected parcels (parcels 4, 3, 5c, 5a, 5d and 5b, Stahl
survey/findings, Exhibit "T>", Addendum) shifting them east 33 feet.
With regard to the disputed property in which Gedo claims ownership, Mr. Stahl
further testified that his research turned up no conveyance of record that describes the
parcel claimed by Gedo (parcel 59, Utah County Plat Map, Exhibit "E", Addendum.)
That parcel is currently being assessed to Miguel David Gedo and a survey has been
performed and filed, based upon the gap description. However, he found no conveyance
document which creates the boundaries of the Gedo claim as it is located by the recorded
survey and described in the tax notice, with the exception of one portion of the boundary
created by a 1986 boundary line agreement between other parties.
Based on records research and on-site inspection, Mr. Stahl testified that the
adjoining owners of Parcels 5 and 2a (Sudweeks and O'Conners) have clearly occupied
and paid taxes on their respective sides of the common boundary line. Moreover, Mr.

Stahl verified that the taxes being currently assessed for the Gedo gap parcel are merely a
duplicate assessment, since the property is already being assessed to Sudweeks.
B.

Gedo Cannot Claim to Be a Good Faith or Bona Fide Purchaser.

When Gedo took title to the disputed property, the errors in description (that led to
the false assumption that the disputed property existed) were a matter of public record.
Utah Code Annotated, § 57-3-102 (Record Imparts Notice) states, in pertinent part:
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner
prescribed by this title,... shall, from the time of recording with the
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that whatever is notice enough to excite attention and
put a purchaser on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such
inquiry might have led. See Meagher v. Dean, 91 P.2d 454 (UT, 1939). Based on this
inquiry responsibility, the Supreme Court has held that where an overlap in descriptions
of properties created a tract that was sold to both the plaintiff and the defendant under
separate deeds—leading to a quiet title action, because the plaintiff recorded its notice of
purchase prior to the recording of the defendant's deed, the defendants took with notice
of the plaintiffs interest, and title to the tract was properly quieted in the plaintiffs.
Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226 (UT 1974).
In the present case, inadvertent mistakes in property descriptions resulted in the
same strip of land being conveyed to Sudweeks and to Gedo. Aside from the fact that
Gedo's deed was void for want of a grantor, as asserted below, the Sudweeks deed was
recorded 27 years prior to the Gedo purchase, giving full notice to Gedo of a need for
inquiry and disqualifying Gedo as a good faith or bona fide purchaser.

C.

Gedo's Deed Was Voidfor Want of a Grantor.

A notable difference between this case and the Wilson case previously cited is that
in this case, what Gedo would have discovered upon reasonable inquiry into the chain of
title was that the lot being sold to him by Alan Strasburg in 1999 did not actually or
validly exist. It was the creation of mistaken mapping, not any patent or deed. Gedo had
a duty to inquire beyond the deeds and maps supplied to him by Mr. Strasburg, the seller.
See Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644 (UT 1954) (to be bona fide, purchaser's inquiry must
go beyond persons known to have an interest in concealing the existence of an
outstanding interest.) An inquiry by Gedo would have shown what Mr. StahPs research
showed: essentially Gedo's deed was void for want of a valid grantor because Mr.
Strasburg had no deed or patent granting him the property. (See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-4
(attempt to convey more than grantor owns)) All Mr. Strasburg had to support a claim
was a tax assessment created when the Utah County Assessor noticed a gap lot (created
by the mistaken description) and assigned it to Strasburg. Meanwhile, the Sudweeks
were also being assessed for the same property.
III.

GEDO'S CLAIMS OF PROCEDURAL ERRORS ARE WITHOUT
MERIT.

Gedo's various allegations of procedural impropriety in the trial court lack any
real basis under the rules of civil procedure. The Gedo brief repeatedly alleges that the
trial court acted improperly. This particular class of allegations concern actions governed
by rules of civil procedure. The claims include: (1) exclusion of evidence, (2) denial of
motions and defenses, (3) improper exercise of jurisdiction, (4) improper changes of

assigned judges, (5) improper service, (6) denial of jury request, and (7) improper
permission to amend complaint. The oft-repeated allegation of a conspiracy between the
court, the U.S. Postal service and Sudweeks counsel to deprive Gedo of notice of court
proceedings is addressed separately.
Because Gedo failed to marshal the evidence to show that the trial court acted
without justification, Sudweeks respectfully lists the allegations by category and refers
the court to authorities and information from the trial court files that contradicts the Gedo
claims.
(1) exclusion of evidence:
Rule 1005 of the Rules of Evidence requires, in pertinent part, that:
The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to be
recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed, including data compilations
in any form, if otherwise admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as
correct in accordance with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness
who has compared it with the original.. .
By Gedo's own admission, the trial court refused to accept "muniments of title"
that Gedo attempted to introduce as evidence because there was no one from the county
recorder's office to authenticate the offerings. Nothing in Gedo's brief points to
improper rejection of evidence under the applicable rules.
"Trial court judges are, necessarily, afforded considerable discretion in
determining the conduct of a trial, including the orderly presentation of evidence."
Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 403 (10th Cir. 1993). In facilitating the presentation
of evidence, the trial judge "is allowed to participate in a trial and ask questions of
witnesses in order to ascertain the facts," United States v. Wheeler, 444 F.2d 385, 390

(10 Cir. 1971), and to "clarify the issues [and] assist the jury in eliminating immaterial
matters." Smith v.Welch, 189 F.2d 832, 835 (10th Cir. 1951).
Because a trial judge is given considerable discretion in determining the conduct
of a trial, "[t]he standard for reversal on the basis of judicial misconduct in a civil trial is
quite high." Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991).
Reversal is not required where the judge emphasizes evidence or expresses skepticism at
a witness' answer, provided the witness has an opportunity to respond. Id. Additionally,
"[cjutting comments to counsel, particularly those relating to skill rather than good faith
or integrity, will not generally mandate reversal." Id.
(2) denial of motions and defenses:
It is noted that Gedo did not plead laches as an affirmative defense in the trial
court, nor was that claim made in any motion, styled as such. Moreover, Gedo did not
ever file a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion. The documents filed by
Gedo with the trial court are included in the Gedo brief as Addendum #5 and include:
"Request for Change of Judge", "Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction,
and Litigation Fees" "Request for Dismissal Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees
$10,000.00, Request to Quash Complaint Orders," "Affidavit and Request for
Disqualification of Judge Nunc Pro Tunc and Certificate of Counsel," and "Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order"
Judge Hansen of the Fourth District Court entered a memorandum decision
striking Gedo's "Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction, Litigation Fees"
and Defendants' "Request for Dismissal Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees"

(Gedo Brief, Addendum #5) (Judge Hansen's Memorandum Decision is Exhibit "K",
Addendum.) The ruling was based on the fact that Rule 10(f), Utah R. Civ. P. provides
that parties may be required to substitute properly prepared pleadings for nonconforming
pleadings. Additionally, Rule 5(d) provides that papers filed with the court "shall be
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service
completed by the person effecting service." Finding the documents illegible and
improper, Judge Hansen struck the pleadings and invited Gedo to submit properly
prepared pleadings. Gedo did not do so.
Gedo's "Request for Change of Judge" was ruled on by Judge Taylor (Gedo Brief
Addendum #5.) Therein he noted Gedo's request required referral to the reviewing judge
under Rule 63(b)(C)(2). He therefore denied Sudweeks' motion to strike, and referred
Gedo's request to Judge Stott for review.
On review, Judge Stott found that the request did not comply with requirements of
applicable rules; the court was unable to understand either the allegations or the basis for
the request, and not being able to identify any impropriety occurred by Judge Taylor or
anyone else, Judge Stott denied the request and referred the case back to Judge Taylor.
(Exhibit "L", Addendum.) The Gedo motion for restraining order was a cross-motion to
Sudweeks' prior motion. Gedo's motion was negated when the Sudweeks opposing
motion was granted after hearing before Judge Hansen. (Exhibit "I", Addendum.) The
denial of injunctive relief is reviewed by an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when
the trial court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no
rational basis in the evidence for the ruling. See Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish

Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (Utah 1996). Comparison of the information filed with the
court regarding the cross motions for temporary restraining order, it is clear that the trial
court had a rational basis for granting injunctive relief to Sudweeks and not to Gedo.
(3) improper exercise of jurisdiction:
Gedo argues at pages 17 and 19 of the brief that Gedo attempted a special or
limited appearance only to submit "muniments of ownership." However, the court record
shows that Gedo filed an answer to the Sudweeks complaint on May 26, 2001 (Gedo
Brief, Addendum #5) wherein Gedo did not enter any defenses specifically, did not claim
or call for a special appearance, did not allege lack of jurisdiction, but did assert
counterclaims against Sudweeks. Even disregarding the fact that Gedo resides in Utah
County, the subject property is in Utah County and all parties are in Utah County and
therefore, jurisdiction is proper in the Fourth District Court pursuant to UCA §78-3-4(1),
Gedo's filing of an answer and counterclaims without any mention of a limited
appearance acted as a general appearance and submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.
Barber v.Calder, 522 .2d 700 (UT 1974).
(4) improper changes of assigned judges:
Inasmuch as this case was initiated by complaint in April of 2001 and did not go to
trial until December of 2003, it is not surprising that under the standard rotation schedule
in the Fourth District Court, at least one change of judges would occur, as it did. Not
understanding the local court management, Gedo has improperly assumed something
sinister in the rotation.
(5) improper service:

Proof of proper service upon Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Sanchez
is included as Exhibit "M", Addendum.
(6) denial of jury request:
Rule 38, Utah R. Civ. P. provides in sub-section (d) (Waiver) the failure of a party
to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as required by this rule (not later than 10 days
after service of the last pleading directed to the issue to be tried) and to file it as required
by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. Granting or denying a belated
demand for jury trial is within the discretion of the trial court. Webb v. Webb, 209 P.2d
201 (UT 1949).
From the court record, after almost 3 years of litigation, at the pre-trial conference,
when all motions and pleadings had long since been filed and the trial was scheduled in
less than 30 days, Gedo claimed a right to a jury trial. Gedo never made the proper
demand as required under the rules, nor did Gedo proffer the necessary fee. The trial
court was well within its discretion in denying the demand.
(7) improper permission to amend complaint:
Motions to amend the complaint are left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Norman v. Arnold, 57 P.3d 997 (UT 2002). Furthermore, liberality should be shown in
allowance of amendments to pleadings for purpose of permitting complete adjudication
of matters in controversy and in furtherance of justice. Johnson v. Peck, 63 P.2d 251 (UT
1936).
After protracted discovery was completed, Sudweeks felt that the introduction of
additional facts warranted the addition of two new theories of ownership and petitioned

the court for leave to amend. Court documentation shows that no ex parte hearing took
place. A copy of the motion was mailed to the addresses on file for Gedo. No opposition
was submitted and the motion was eventually granted. Gedo cannot claim prejudice
because the amendment came almost a year before the trial was set.
For each allegation of wrong-doing, documents from the court or from Gedo,
show that any dissatisfaction was the result of Gedo's misunderstanding of the
appropriate procedural requirements or Gedo's own misapplication of the rules. In no
case can it be said that the court acted inappropriately or that Gedo was prejudiced by a
procedural error of the court.
IV.

GEDO'S CLAIMS OF CONSPIRACY AND EX PARTE
COMMUNICATION ARE UNDERMINED BY FACTS IN THE
RECORD.

Gedo's accusations of conspiracy, ex parte communication and other illegal or
improper conduct by the court and counsel, (and the purported deprivation of
fundamental rights as a result) are wholly unsupported and are undermined by the
pleadings on file.
The only evidence of ex parte communication in the entire case is the court's
rejection of an attempt by Gedo to communicate with Judge Hansen ex parte. (Exhibit
"N", Addendum.) Similarly, the many references by Gedo to mailing errors are purely
distractive to the central duty of litigants to supply the court with their proper address.
Gedo's claim of a conspiracy is made moot by the fact that Gedo appeared at every
hearing and conference that was held in this matter. Since Gedo was in attendance at
every hearing and conference; since Gedo received notice of every decision in time to

respond; and since no motion was granted for lack of a response from Gedo, if there was
any error, it was harmless.
V.

ATTORNEYS FEES WERE PROPERLY AWARDED AGAINST
TWO DEFENDANTS FOR CONTEMPT UNDER THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.

The trial court properly awarded attorney fees and costs as a sanction against
James and David Gedo for their violation of a Temporary Restraining Order. A
Temporary Restraining Order was first issued by Judge Hansen upon evidence that those
two individuals had approached Mr. Sudweeks on his property, holding a breaker bar in
hand, where they made threats against his health and safety, and that of his wife and
family. (Exhibit "I", Addendum.) These same two individuals were present in the court
hearing when the Temporary Restraining Order was converted to a Preliminary
Injunction against them—prohibiting any communication or contact with the Sudweeks.
(Exhibit "J", Addendum.)
At trial, evidence was presented which confirmed that these same two individuals
subsequently placed threatening phone calls on two different days to Sudweeks' home,
again threatening Mr. Sudweeks and his wife and family with physical violence.
"Unless limited by statute or constitutional provisions, the extent of punishment
for contempt is discretionary with the court..." 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 117 (1999). Under
Utah Code Ann., § 78-32-11 (1992) (as amended) attorney fees may be awarded in a
contempt proceeding brought for a party's failure to comply with an order. See,
Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 533 (Utah 1981). An award of attorney fees is
wholly appropriate as a contempt sanction for violation of a court order, particularly

where violent threats are involved. Thus, the trial court had a considerable amount of
discretion in sanctioning Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo, and absent an abuse of
that discretion, the trial court's order should stand.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment quieting title in the Sudweeks is supported by credible
evidence as well as appropriate statutory guidelines related to public records of title. At
trial, the Sudweeks demonstrated the nature and cause of the boundary description error
leading to conflicting ownership claims. The evidence showed that two different deeds
(the first to Sudweeks in 1972, the second to Gedo in 1999) purported to convey the same
33' wide strip of property. Chain of title research demonstrated that at the time the
property was conveyed to Sudweeks, the grantors were vested with title to the land, but
the property description was mistakenly offset by 33 feet to the west. In direct contrast,
never at any time was title properly vested in Gedo's grantor; there being no deed or
patent that granted the disputed parcel to Mr. Strasburg, Gedo's predecessor. Therefore,
the trial court's ruling is proper and should be upheld.
Gedo's claims of impropriety are groundless, and arise from a misunderstanding
of procedural requirements. They create no basis for relief from the Court. This is
particularly true in light of Gedo's failure to marshal evidence as required for all appeals.
Sudweeks respectfully ask that the appeal be denied on all points and that the trial court
ruling stand.
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Exhibit "A"
Provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations

United States Constitution: Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

United States Constitution: Amendment XIV
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.

57-1-4. Attempted conveyance of more than grantor owns — Effect.
A conveyance made by an owner of an estate for life or years, purporting to convey a
greater estate than he could lawfully transfer, does not work a forfeiture of his estate, but
passes to the grantee all the estate which the grantor could lawfully transfer.

57-3-102. Record imparts notice - Change in interest rate -- Validity of document - Notice of unnamed interests -- Conveyance by grantee.
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed
by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with
Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location
complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with Section
70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured
obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document provided under
Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the parties to
the document and all other persons who have notice of the document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names the
grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or
stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with notice of any interest
of the grantor or of the interest of any other person not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free
and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in
any other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets forth the names of the
beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real property subject to the
interest.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final
judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions
of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United
States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States
or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree
or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree
felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative
subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of
record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review

those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue
all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other
local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or
capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved.
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to
his rights therein, is caused by the contempt, the court, in addition to thefineor
imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in place thereof, may order the person
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify him
and to satisfy his costs and expenses; which order and the acceptance of money under it is
a bar to an action by the aggrieved party for such loss and injury.

UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required.
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the
court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every
pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery,
every written motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice,
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon
each of the parties.
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that:
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court;
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be
served with all pleadings and papers;
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any
hearing necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the
defaulting party;
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of
judgment under Rule 58A(d); and
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in
default for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of
summons in Rule 4.
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest,
attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is
named as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an
answer, claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or
possession of the property at the time of its seizure.
(b) Service: How made and by whom.
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon
a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or
upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last
known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court.
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to
the party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in charge

thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein;
or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the
person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein; or, if consented to in writing by the person to
be served, delivering a copy by electronic or other means.
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of
a hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service,
service shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by electronic
means is complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal
business hours at the place receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on
the next business day.
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court:
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a
judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it;
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be
served by the party preparing it; and
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually
large number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may
order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be
made as between the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed
to be denied or avoided by all other parties and that the filing of any such pleading
and service thereof upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A
copy of every such order shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form
as the court directs.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be
filed with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The
papers shall be accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and
manner of service completed by the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs
the filing of papers related to discovery.
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers with the
court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the
court, except that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon the filing date and
forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk.

UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and other
papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the
court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or other
paper, and the name, if known, of the judge (and commissioner if applicable) to
whom the case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need only state the name of
the first party on each side with an indication that there are other parties. A party
whose name is not known shall be designated by any name and the words "whose
true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown parties shall be designated as
"all unknown persons who claim any interest in the subject matter of the action."
Every pleading and other paper filed with the court shall also state the name,
address, telephone number and bar number of any attorney representing the party
filing the paper, which information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the
first page. Every pleading shall state the name and address of the party for whom it
is filed; this information shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page
of the pleading. The plaintiff shall file together with the complaint a completed
cover sheet substantially similar in form and content to the cover sheet approved by
the Judicial Council.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense shall be
made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far
as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may
be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon a
separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear
presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be adopted by
reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading, or in any
motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other papers filed with
the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be typewritten, printed
or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed paper of letter size (8 V2" x
11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches above any typed material, a lefthand margin of not less than 1 inch, a right-hand margin of not less than one-half
inch, and a bottom margin of not less than one-half inch. All typing or printing
shall be clearly legible, shall be double-spaced, except for matters customarily
single-spaced or indented, and shall not be smaller than 12-point size. Typing or
printing shall appear on one side of the page only.
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature lines, and all
signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink.

(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the court shall
examine all pleadings and other papersfiledwith the court. If they are not prepared
in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept thefilingbut may require
counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconforming papers. The clerk
or the court may waive the requirements of this rule for parties appearing pro se.
For good cause shown, the court may relieve any party of any requirement of this
rule.
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper filed in any
action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or without notice,
authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original.

UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the
summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after
service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served
with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty
days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the
answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by
the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise
directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as
follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed
to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding
to the remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the
merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the
court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at
the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the
hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order
of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within such
other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the
motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and
objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party
shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the
light of any evidence that may have been received.

(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of
such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion
to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be
awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the
reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00
undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and
charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of
any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking
as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion
of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.

UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 38. Jury trial of right.
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or as
given by statute shall be preserved to the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a
jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a demand
therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later
than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such
demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the party.
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues
which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by
jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of
the issues, any other party, within 10 days after service of the demand or such
lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any
other or all of the issues of fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as
required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by
him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be
withdrawn without the consent of the parties.

UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge.
(a) Substitute judge; Prior testimony. If the judge to whom an action has been
assigned is unable to perform the duties required of the court under these rules,
then any other judge of that district or any judge assigned pursuant to Judicial
Council rule is authorized to perform those duties. The judge to whom the case is
assigned may in the exercise of discretion rehear the evidence or some part of it.
(b) Disqualification.
(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify
a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in
good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show
bias, prejudice or conflict of interest.
(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than
20 days after the last of the following:
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge;
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or
(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based.
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall be
filed as soon as practicable.
(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule 11 and
subjects the party or attorney to the procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party
may file more than one motion to disqualify in an action.
(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without
further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and
affidavit to a reviewing judge. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall direct
the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council to assign another judge to the action or hearing. The
presiding judge of the court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like
jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the
reviewing judge.
(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed,
filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another
judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or the presiding officer
of the Judicial Council to do so.

(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider any
part of the record of the action and may request of the judge who is the subject of
the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to questions posed by the
reviewing judge.
(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah Stool

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and
DEANNA SUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

J>C

MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES Cil'\Ui,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and
MARTHA O'CONNOR.

Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants.
<

•''

•

»r<-_ !..-,, i:

., i.v,.,.),,; a!K] j )liit;i;;., '-•(!<... ', v, ;->. .i-.! through counsel,

Brett C Anderson, i-: the lav. firm Hansen Witt Morley & Anderson, I' <' and Complain against the
Defendants above named, a u! ilie-v* a<= lollows:
1.

Pl.uiitiM's

•

• s i d i n g in U t a h I oi.;

2.

Defendants Maria Angelica Sanchez, Miguel Dav.dv.iOv!';. lames Gedo, Johnny Ray

O'Conner and Ma'-t!;;1,'»'''Ptincr, aiL i--!:v;d!;nls residing :., =
3.

I

:-.:.•.:^ v.., , u i h .

*

-'••

rwnparcv. ;...;i real property in Pleasant v. novo City, Utah County, State

of Utah (the "Sudvveeks Properu" • < no parcel which is described in the Warrant) Deed from Joseph
Best.::' * !'!
91

i

.i.itol lunr 'I

|'» n

.inriii i unloil limo .'. , l ' ) 7 j : i , 1 nlr\ No.

and Page 224 of the Records of the Utah County Recorder's Office, and the second

. .lii.gs due -ociaidiiiv- > . sidings
to Plaintiffs, dated Auguv 2':

K

* 1 as Entry No, 13361, Book 1290 and Page 108 of the Records

ofthe I [t a 1 'fVim'* ^<v *- ;!?»•'- f *' \ • \ <•:*' <*' .K '
'V

.

'*

"

r nlliu hnl lieirti asKIn!.it

jmplamt.

Sudwceks have beui !iu M ' \ and e x c l u d e owners of the above described
parcels smee

l

.

^

'

•"

i

:

' ~1.

\ ;,iuui.,i.} Juiii. * i^u */ * wnner and Martha O'Conner are the owner - f a ; -

of real properK in I" oas.iii! (iroxe Titv. (Ymniv i»f Utah, State of Utah '•h^ "< N 'Oonne r nropc"*

,s

/ aMuuty Deed from Mi.san ^ Haidinger to Defendants i JVonner dated August in. 19".. a*\ u . 64616, Book :W)7 and Pages 855 and 856 ofthe Records of the - '*

6.

" •

Defendant Maria Angelica Sanchez and Defendant Miguel David Gedo claini an

ownership intere^' '"

rt

*r nr*^-'- *• n !rasar- ' ^ \

"!aih|at Propel

... ^ . . D . J .ii i.ic ^ ...; * ^n

iJec-d trom Miguel l »avid Gedo to Maria

Angelica Sanchez dated October 8,2000 and recorded October ! *.». i 909 as Entr\ W 1 i ? '33, Pook
5248 and Pa<zes65-1 6^6 ofthe Re,vi > • '*:'

7.

M > 11 I I t

Tlu ^Mi»jL-cl ic il piupcrty paael is approximately 33 feet \>"!e and K*

between the SudwcV.
subject

•i

=Kt

'

«.

; ;.;. . u ^ i.
8.

TheMihiect real property parcel r 1 - 1 the O'Conner Property were pan: tofa larger tract

nil iinl ' Inn Ii \\ is I

. /

. ecessors in interest.

2

9.
Pr0pC

The boundary between the O'Conner Property on the west and the subject real
: --^ * -nd drr eix'::*

rh parrel on the east is marked
e, ai id the fei ice was . . J

":.•:::•

s

*-. ,l\ have both been in existence
...

the pin cl lase of their pai eels

in 1972.
;

j

. ,

been recognized ana Ucaied b) the pen .JO> UJ:W ^ en predecessor m miuei^wib inebuiinuai\ hciv. ; v i,
the subject real property ptn -. .

*

< -lane :i L Plaintiffs mopertv on the east since 1972 when

he Plaintiffs ha^ L leasonabiy believed thai their property line extended up U

}

-.

fence :md envewav line srr.ee thL-v purchased their parcels in 1(>72, and the v 1IMV--* *; mtinued to use
!

Lb, L \ : . . .

,-

. ..:

n

aspha ' pad on the same.
•d •• :"!M- V!-'Lici Davu1 ' -v • lames Ge.1
•*

t

r .-m; mtentiona.

.. ve a wreckme :iu^k upon an..

>*V Va-i.i / • -<Ju i Sanche.
„ * me sa;m e«. me -laini.;: *-

property directly in front of the Plaintiffs motor home.
diking nflhe w terknii' lurk 'i ics piolvihl Ihe Plaintiffs fiem

II\IIU«

their in I i

l^me^MU .I.L> ^jwi^-t lunwve , ;l*. n ..icir property.
.*v< ithstanding the demands from Plaintiffs to Defendants Miguel David Gedo,
iS

•* * '*- • •
i

x

ia A ngelica Sai ichez , i eqi lesting the /!: the 1 « > i Peking ti i lck be reiiio'''\ 'edfi:or i ii I

I I'ian'ttil'is' motor home, said Defendants have refiised to remove the wrecking truck fi oi n

jii iron! of Plaintiffs' motor home, claiming said Defendants have title to the subject property as

3

i IKS I ! \ U M , O l ACTION
(Quiet Iiiicl
15.

Plaintiffs re-aliein and IIK oipnuln .tl1 n' flu foregoing paragraphs herein by this

re fen in t
Id

Plaintiffs are the record owners of the two parcels ul i< alpiopntv as d uii'

paragraph 3 hen in
I>

Plaintiffs have been the sole and exclusive fee simple owners of said two parcels

of real property since the> acquired the r<\\
I-

' r, ~".

Pl.nnlifli 11*1 vt soli l> an:. .^i u ;>«.u) used and occupied the said two parcels of

real property since they acquired the sanv :•; "*'".'.: to the exclusion of all others.
i l>

Plaintiffs have been the ^.l.

•

"'TW tec

-OMC owners of the subject 31

ile ('iiu el ik »i i ibed in paragraph 6 herein to the exclusion of all others since Plaintiffs
acquired the same in 1972.
2(1

Plaintiffs h.ivr snh Is .nid > '

"

IL.CCI

and occupied the said subject 33 foot

w nil' |uuel ol ical pioputy desciibed in paragraph 6 herein, to the exclusion of all others
Jl

Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree and oulei qim lmt> lull in I'l.iintills, and against

Defendants herein n inn d in III* paurls ol leal pioperly described in Paragraphs 3 and (> herein
M TON!) CAUSE OF ACTION
(Boundaij It) Au|iiirsi i m <i
22.

Plaiulill i. it1 alkj;i and uuoipoiatc all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this

reference.
23.

Plaintiffs have occupied th< n r<'>ptrti\< pmpulj rind lieakd it as thtir own up to

tin1 Inn • ": " is iiiciit i tl b) a lence and duveway on the east side of the subject 33 foot wide
parcel winch is claimed to be owned by Defendant Sanchez and Detoinlrinl Mo«ui I 1 )A\ id * n do
4

?

s! <-i [hsu predecessors in interest have occupied their respective
property only P :

•* uii the eac< side

fence, :. ~>wv „..»: ^rrespond, .; ...n..u. - • „ w. ,• i the cast side of wn subject ^> l.v; ui.u
parcel claimed to be owned hy Defendant Sanchez and Defendant Daivd Miguel *">d<-

line, M iiiu- K> ihaiK-.*' ;>y the fence and driveway, and corresponding line, as the boundary
between the OVOUIH'T property and »\ ^'udweeks property.
..r »< >'< \ Miner are adjoining landowners,, as were
Plaintins and Defendant O'Connor's predecessors in interest.
27

1 Maintiffs are entitled " ; decrc • -''h '

r t r '• :

east bi^c oi the odbject parcel, JI-IM- de^eti'Dea.. is the
ii

a!ii:ary between the O'Conner ProperU and die Stuhveeks Property.
.v
M:

e

actermining tluu i iuuitilb IIUVL acquneu M»IC and e x u u u v e ::,e u me above described 33

foot wide subject parcel via the doctrine of boundary hv vvn'-i'scence.
THIRP
(Prescriptive Easement)
29

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the foie^owv.' naraeraohs herein tr

30.

Plaintiffs have openly used and < ^ , upkd he subject parcel u Such H described m

paragraph 6 above :\"<\ h:n*c treated it as tbe-~

•

,;..,-;•.•

ihe parcel which is claimed n; ot L-WIICU by Defendant Sanchez ai.-i
Defendant Miguel David Gedo, and Plaintiffs have so occupied the same continuously since
5

l

1972.

31

'•

During Plaintiffs' i ise and occupation of the subject parcel, Plaintiffs have erected

a fence, planted trees, grass and plants, and have constructed an asphalt pad on the subject
propei ty and used the same to park their motor home.
;

IMamuff>' use o:* i\\c 'ubject parcel has at all times been adverse to the Defendaiits

'laiiiiifi^* use o; im ^uijcci paiVv I ikj.> a: all times been notorious.
\l\c alternative \* I'K Ouiet 'I ;ta- and [boundary by Acquiescence claims,
I'Lihl

'

r

l

'*

:•

easement in the subject parcel whicl. runs u it; Me <ame, and mat said prescriptive easement
• iil vv.dude al! o r !be ^;iu;e;-f " •* •*< -^ v- the
same,

; ;. «: .:i

.

. \ ^

r,,!

iee and d»-!\:-". v ^''c* ,M' f b 0:1^1 c u j e

.^

M

fthe

,-_.. growing ai id maintaining plants, trees, .

and grass, and other typical and general uses.
FOI IRTHC M ISE OF "I C I IOT I"
(Trespa.* • , :. \liguel Da\ id Gedo, James Gedo and Mai la Angelica Sanchez)
iaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this
referei ice.
! >eK iidaiits ^Miguel David Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez have acted in such a
manner as to damaue the Plaintiili' property, and have prohibited them from the quiet use and
1

tamiii'ls are entitled to judgment against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James
Credo '"-d Maria Angelica Sanchez for damages and for injury to Plaintiffs' property in an
ai 1 10111 it to be si io\ \ 1 1 at ti ial.
38

Plaintiffs are also entitled to punitive damages as a result of Defendant Miguel
6

trespass on Plaintiffs* propeily with knowing and intentional disregard for Plaintiffs' rights
therein, in an amount to be determined at ti lal.
HI'Ml i U ISM HI ACTION
(Forcible Detainer by Miguel Dnivri Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica
S i in I I n ' )

39

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this

reference.
40,

i

!'.. • ..... .

. . \ . J : . » .\;iyjwt*i i a n j ; . - .

iinlawfully enter a portion of Plaintiffs' prope?t\ m Plaintiffs" absence and have exch ,
Plaintiffs from use-w:.'r-r^-e^Gi'*:-of Plaintiff" rrop-T!\ v r ;.:r

\

*

i:

^"*?

the same to be paiK..^ „it i'ijim.;]. ' property between Plaintiffs niiiu-i n^ne and the \UA,U\.
street.
41.

n

•

I

S.iiicliL/. have damaged the i'i untiitb and

ILAL

prohibited them horn the quiet use dial ui|u>u •- *

ol their property.
i lei Da ' - id Gedo lames Gedo ai l i I\ lai ia A ngelica Sanchez 1 la e
refuse* in M n i ei ider Plaint I ffs' property being unlawfully occupied by said Defendants after
denial* w-i*= made on <;\U\ Defendants for the surrender uf the
l

.

*^VP\I^^

unlawfully em---^

.

LS

Gedo and \\ana Angelica Sanchez loi damages anting trom said 1 >etendants> forcible detain, in an amount to be i>in ^ •* -< *M- •
44

Purina

^

v wv;w

Aim. $, •• ;. , • , , .Jfs are entitled to have their

damages against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez for
7

jj'Mwui to i taii k *'th* Aim s> /*>- >b-10.5. Plaintiffs are entitled lr
r . ^ t i t ^ i . ^ directing Defendar^ Miguel David Gedo, James !~ do

-. \

- •-• .

i'^.perty being unlawfully - . eupied b\ said Defendants an
n> renove all property of said Defendants and to restore said premises to Plaintiffs or be forcibly
f

removed by a sheriff 11

''
S I X T H CAUSE O F A C T I O N
(111 junction)

••

I liiinlifTs rr-alleL't" ;ind inn>ipoiaU' all of, (In- loiegomg paiagiap.ib nerein by this

reference.
47.

"iaintiffs are entitled h •

I-M-MM^

fii; • : i t 1 c :ciip> ii lg 01 ti espassing
48.

?> relief permanently ei yoinii lg the [Vfaidunt11

I

I laintiffs are entitled to muiL-. . •. c relief directing Defendants Miguel David

Gedo, James Gedo a"d Marin Vv v J-Vp S:uv-i\\ recking ti i lck ai id

-AWJI

[;i^t^:,j

•-.*•*

'

*

p. t «^u -n h a m u l i . piup^rU in oi under the direction of

said Defendants,
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs J : 1 n I R Si ldv = eks and Deani la Si iii/vv eeks pi a> for ji idgi i lei it
ayainsl llit: Deteiidarits as follows:
1.

On the First Cause or' Action for n< order quieting title in Plaintiffs to the parcels

of real j. * rr -*• Jc
2.

5

r- • >

e n .... fecund Cause oi v n« i ;

ne alternative, awarding to Plaintiffs, the

parcel of real property described in paragraph 6 above, under the doctrine of Boundary I y
A • :quiescence.
3.

On the Third Cause of Action in the alternative, declaring a prescriptive easement
p

growing and maintaining trees, plants and grass, and other typical and general uses.
On the Fourth C^n^c of Acti-"1 '^r 1 ^!' r,vr - c r ' -"•' " i ,s!T ,%1 damauec a°-Mnst

4.

Defendants Miguel Da i id G. -.•

. s i ;-:ul „...i .\,«.... ^ v . . u aancnez L a;, umo,..

>e

shown at trial.

Miguel Dai\ id Ucuu, jaines Gedo and Maria Angelica Sam SK,/ in an amount to be determined at
f MI. a::»: an order ot'restitu:j«i «int-ctiniz Defendants Miguel 1 )avw' ( u\\n kunes Gedn <ud
.

,

,

-

.

.

i; • , • * > .

•

, .

;

N

y said Defendants and to restore said premises u PlamUi.
n

6.
. •

i

n

J

• ^^i*- Cain* ^f Action rwv^f an i""a:\ ' •• r Tmanentlv ""•' — n<:

v..^

f

.

I .. . .:..,. . . ^ancnez ;:.;.;; uhiiiL,

occupying or trespassing on the subject parcel H real proneiK and directing said Defendants :
remove said nropcr" *Kc ^ -rrVi^i- trurk -r real proper; . v ^ ..
7.

n* t v " --V « :

jl

./- ,"

,,.. vi.;^,..,*. u* ou.vi ; ^iendaiiij.

For an order that Defendants Miguel Daivd Gedo, James Gedo and Maria
s

\ il.W

\,

-'1 MltV

8.

|

for Ddtii oilier aiKi ;»Hihu iuiu as the i u.ai niav deem appropriate under the

circumstances.
I) = \ 1 ED tl lis £L_i_,di i.) i f • J l '

('

,2003.

HANSEN WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
9

MAILING CERTIFICATE
1 hereby cerUv th:it •' n< i..-.; •< :>ue ant! mrrect coin ,•• (lie foregoing, AIMKMM1',I)
( OIMTI AlNI,p

p. .-j • ,\

.

1, on

following:
Maria Angelica Sanchez
West 800 NV• TTtah84P.
.i.L'iiel David Gedo
- '"Box 970002
Orem, Utah 84097
Miguel David Gedo
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84061
James Gedo
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84061
Johnny Ray O'Connor
1640 East Battlecreek Dr.
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Martha O'Connor
1640 East Battlecreek Dr.
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
John and Deanna Sudv* . '••
1610 East 200 South
Pleasant Grove, I 'tali .S4oo_

2 1

'NO',, In !ln-

Exhibit "C"
Complaint

COPY

-v r ~'<Rt

C
Brett C. Anderson, Bar No. 8134
Gordon W. Duval, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Telephone (801) 785-5350
Facsimile (801) 785-0853

:i ! \

A

:\ l n

JL

i'R

MAY 2 I 2001

IAL U O

i M l i C •' •

\ H COUNTN , STATi'()!• U I A H
, / 5 North HH) West, Prow,. \ \ M601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and
DEANNA SUDWEEKS,

MPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

^(•/Affd
i
i

vs.

- -

MARIA ANGELICA SANCUu/., M K I U I ;
DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO. JOHNNY
RAY O'CONNOR, and MARTHA
O'CONNOR,

COME NOW, Plaintiffs .s>-lir; K. Sudweeks and Deanna Sudweeks, by and through
counsel, Brett C
the Defendants at

v.; .» *, ; - - .. . iV.^i
• ••' •.' ::-..'1

'HCLV

. -.1- .-j i ', , • <u tU omplam against

as follows:

1.

"he Plaintiffs are incljv lduals residing in Utah County, State of Utah.

2.

Defendants Maria Angelica Sanchez, Miguel David Ge

.

,

:.nny

Ray O' 'Com 101 ai id I"\ lai tha ()' Connoi ai e indi idi lals i: esidii lg Ii: 11 Jtah C :>i n it;;
State o f Utah.
3

Plaintiffs own two parcels of real property in Pleasant Grove I u>. Lu... - x.-unty,
State of I Jtah (the " "Si idv r eeks I 'roper t) "). 01 le • pai eel v '

!f scribed in uie

Warranty Deed from Joseph Best and Ehunne P. B J M i^ PiaiPlitfs, dated June 2 1 .

i]

•- Kecords of the Utah County Recorder's Office, and the second parcel which is

described in the Warranty Deed from Boyd M. Collings and Geraldine L, Collings

of the Records of the Utah County Recorder's < )ffice. A copy of each of these
Deeds is attacu^ hereto as Exhibit "Ar and Exhibit "B" to this Con lplaint
4.

" ;;

\ \ r e been the sole and exclusive owners of the above described

parcels since they purchased the same in 1972,

pareH of real proper! v in Pleasant Grove C'n\ < our.n ot Utah, State of- Utah (Uie
"( * -i?:.x . Proper;,

.. .

u.u,u: ,!,., -

. :. J ca.,i ^.... _ ..

Sanchez Property as described in the WaiTanty Deed from Susan S. Hardinger to
Defendants O'Connor dated August 1 °
Pages «H,") ^ ami S •(Hml (Jit1 I(n nm ih i»

2

1

9 9 4 as Entry N o . 64616, Book 3507 and
:ah C :)i n it;; R ecoi dei 's Offic- 5

,!|

• :• : p;; '

of the Deed is attached hei eto as Exhibit " "C
6.

Defendant Maria Angelica Sanchez owns property in Pleasant Grove City, County
of Utah, State of I Jtah (the "Sanchez Property "), vv hich is dest. A>^ .L . .
(lauii I )eed from Mij'.m'l I ,:<ivii"il (unit h I In 1,1 Z"1 ii|',Hicn Sanchez dated October
8, 2000 and recorded Octobu
Pages <• >-

'

' : 999 as Kntr V

. . i, i-v^u;.:

' ; 2433, Book 5 2 4 - and

,.

•• * i

this D e e d is attached hereto as Exhibit " D " to this Complaint.
7.

The Sanchez Property contains two separate parts, one part which is
ttpjiuiAiiiiiilcly t I l i d \ 'nk ,iii(l hi s du'cifh, 1)1 I sr< in \\w Sudweeks Properly m
the east, and the O'Connor Property on the west, and the second part which lies
directly to the south of the <) < omui; Property.

8.

Tin Siinrluv Piopi rh w In* li i\ approximately 33 feet wide and lies directly
between the Sudweeks Property and the O'Connor Property is the subject of this
action.

9#

B 0 t h parts of the Sanchez Property and tin* (>'• u r n m Property were p a n of a
larger tract of land which was owneo

• -. • •". ; C I K : J ; , U predecessors .;* m i c *

een the O'Connor Property on the west and the Sanchez
Property on the east is marked by a fence and driveway, which have both been in
existence for a lun^ d u n , and1 I he (niic u as a n led h • I'H' I'l.rulifts slu»rth

3

,h

"

the purchase of their parcels in 1.972.
11,

I lit1 \ oiiespoiHhn|» (tumid.ii y Inn1 svlncli r. ni.uknl l»v the (nice and driveway, has
been recognized and treated hv the parties and their predecessors in interest as the
boundary between the Sanchc^ i iuperty on the west ai id the Plaintiffs' p i Dpei t)
IM) t'n'«' i -I »•'"' »* l*>71 win

*\ i'hintiffs purchased their two parcels which are

above described.
12

•.-. - i-.ii..,;: • ..ave reasonat/^

..

•

•• *

e

fence a n c j driveway line since they purchased their parceK in 1 ^~2, and ine\ Ihr.
continued to use and occupy the same since that time, and have planter

-.- trppc

grass, plai its, ai id ha1 e laid an asphalt pad • ;: n the sai ne
x J.

Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez did
knowingly and intentionally drive a wrecking d uck upon ,nul - In) pat kiln s.inr ' ii
the riainfiffV prnpcrl1, direr tlv in front of the Plaintiffs' motor home.
'.'The parking of theW-ecking truck does prohibit the Plaintiffs from using their

I Notwithstanding the demands from Plaintiffs to Defendants Miguel David Gedo,
James ^ ^ i o and Maria Angelica Sanchez, .•.-. . „ ,c

• ';

ren iov* ;d in >m in front of Plaintiffs' motor home, said Defendants have ieluded io
remove the wrecking truck from in front of Plaintiffs' motor home.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Boundary by Acquiescence)

16.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this
reference.

17.

Plaintiffs have occupied their respective property and treated it as their own up to
the line which is marked by a fence and driveway on the east side of the parcel
which is now owned by the Defendant Sanchez, and Plaintiffs have so occupied
the same continuously since 1972.

18.

Defendants or their predecessors in interest have occupied their respective
property only up to and on the east side of the fence, driveway and corresponding
line, which fence, driveway and corresponding line are located on the east side of
the property now owned by Defendant Sanchez.

19.

The parties and their predecessors in interest have acquiesced in the boundary
line, which is marked by the fence and driveway, as the boundary between the
parcel which is now owed by the Defendant Sanchez and the parcel which is now
owned by the Plaintiffs.

20.

The Plaintiffs and Defendant Sanchez are adjoining landowners, as were Plaintiffs
and Defendant Sanchez' predecessors in interest.

21.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of the Court determining that the fence, driveway
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and corresponding line on the east side of the Sanchez Property, above described,
is the boundary between the smaller Sanchez Property and the Sudweeks Property.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Prescriptive Easement)

22.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this
reference.

23.

Plaintiffs have openly used and occupied the subject property which is described
in paragraph 8 above and have treated it as their own up to the line which is
marked by a fence and driveway on the east side of the parcel which is now
owned by Defendant Sanchez, and Plaintiffs have so occupied the same
continuously since 1972.

24.

During Plaintiffs' use and occupation of the subject property, Plaintiffs have
erected a fence, planted trees, grass and plants, and have constructed an asphalt
pad on the subject property and used the same to park their motor home.

25.

Plaintiffs' use of the subject property has at all times been adverse to the
Defendants and their predecessors in interest.

26.

Plaintiffs' use of the subject property has at all times been notorious.

27.

In the alternative to the Boundary by Acquiescence claim, Plaintiffs are entitled to
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a decree of the Court determining that the Plaintiffs have a prescriptive easement
in the subject property which runs with the same, and that said prescriptive
easement shall include all of the subject property up to the fence and driveway
line on the east side of the same, and it shall provide for the use of parking
vehicles, growing and maintaining plants, trees and grass, and other typical and
general uses.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass by Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez)

28.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this
reference.

29.

Defendants Miguel David Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez have acted in such a
manner as to damage the Plaintiffs' property, and have prohibited them from the
quiet use and enjoyment of the same.

30.

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James
Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez for damages and for injury to Plaintiffs'
property in an amount to be shown at trial.

31.

Plaintiffs are also entitled to punitive damages as a result of Defendant Miguel
David Gedo's, Defendant James Gedo's, and Defendant Maria Angelica Sanchez'
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intentional trespass on Plaintiffs' property with knowing and intentional disregard
for Plaintiffs' rights therein, in an amount to be determined at trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Forcible Detainer by Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez)

32.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this
reference.

33.

Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez did
unlawfully enter a portion of Plaintiffs' property in Plaintiffs' absence and have
excluded Plaintiffs from possession of the portion of Plaintiffs' property by
parking a wrecking truck or causing the same to be parked on Plaintiffs' property
between Plaintiffs' motor home and the public street.

34.

The actions of Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica
Sanchez have damaged the Plaintiffs and have prohibited them from the quiet use
and enjoyment of their property.

35.

Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez have
refused to surrender Plaintiffs' property being unlawfully occupied by said
Defendants after demand was made on said Defendants for the surrender of the
premises unlawfully entered.
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36.

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James
Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez for damages arising from said Defendants'
forcible detainer in an amount to be shown at trial.

37.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10, Plaintiffs are entitled to have their
damages against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria
Angelica Sanchez for forcible detainer trebled in an amount to be shown at trial.

38.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10.5, Plaintiffs are entitled to an order of
restitution directing Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria
Angelica Sanchez to vacate that portion of Plaintiffs' property being unlawfully
occupied by said Defendants and to remove all property of said Defendants and to
restore said premises to Plaintiffs or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Injunction)

39.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this
reference.

40.

Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief permanently enjoining the Defendants
from occupying or trespassing on Plaintiffs' property.

41.

Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief directing Defendants Miguel David
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Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez to remove from Plaintiffs'
property the recking truck and any other property placed on Plaintiffs' property by
or under the direction of said Defendants.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs John R. Sudweeks and Deanna Sudweeks pray for judgment
against the Defendants as follows:
1.

On the First Cause of Action hereof quieting title in Plaintiffs to all property west
of the boundary fence and driveway on the basis of boundary by acquiescence.

2.

On the Second Cause of Action in the alternative, declaring a prescriptive
easement in Plaintiffs to all property west of the fence and driveway for use of
parking vehicles, growing and maintaining trees, plants and grass, and other
typical and general uses.

3.

On the Third Cause of Action hereof for actual and punitive damages against
Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez in an
amount to be shown at trial.

4.

On the Fourth Cause of Action hereof for trebled damages against Defendants
Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez in an amount to be
determined at trial, and an order of restitution directing Defendants Miguel David
Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez to vacate that portion of the
subject property being unlawfully occupied by said Defendants and to restore said

10

premises to Plaintiffs.
5.

On the Fifth Cause of Action hereof an injunction permanently enjoining
Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez from
occupying or trespassing on the subject property and directing said Defendants to
remove from said property the wrecking truck and any other property placed on
said property by or under the direction of said Defendants.

6.

For Plaintiffs' costs and attorney fees incurred herein.

7.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate under the
circumstances.

DATED t h i s J y d a y of April, 2001.
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs' Address:
c/o Brett C. Anderson, Esq.
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
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Exhibit "D"
Stahl survey/findings
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Utah County Plat
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Exhibit "F"
Order and Judgment

COP
BLED

Brett C. Anderson, Bar No. 8134
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853

Fourth Judicial LDisfnrt r v
of I hah r~
x "^inct C-our t
^ C o u n t y «tate of Utah
OeniA) *«

q6{

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and
DEANNA SUDWEEKS
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 01-0402488

MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and MARTHA
O'CONNOR,

Judge: James R. Taylor

Defendants.

On December 15 and 16, 2003, a trial was conducted in the above-mentioned matter, the
Honorable James R. Taylor presiding. Plaintiffs, John R. Sudweeks and Deanna Sudweeks,
appeared in person and were represented by counsel of record, Brett C. Anderson, WITT
MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. Defendants Maria Angelica Sanchez, Miguel David Gedo,
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James Gedo, Johnny Ray O'Connor, and Martha O'Connor appeared in person,pro se. The
Court heard evidence from the parties.
The Court, having reviewed the file, and being otherwise fully apprized in the matter,
hereby makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The Court finds John B. Stahl's testimony convincing and therefore adopts Plaintiffs'
Exhibit #1.
2. The Court finds that the deed of distribution of the estate of Ivadell Tomlinson in 1972
contained an erroneous legal description. The decree mistakenly located the east line of
lot 11 (parcel 1-40-440011) westward 33 feet from its correct position.
3. This mistake shifted the west boundary of the estate of Ivadell Tomlinson by 33 feet.
4. The estate of Ivadell Tomlinson was subsequently divided into real property consisting of
four parcels or lots, to wit: (1) lot 16 (parcel 1-40-440016), (2) lot 13 (parcel 1-40440013), (3) lot 14 (parcel 1-40-440014), and (4) lot 15 (parcel 1-40-440015). The legal
descriptions of the above-mentioned lots perpetuated the error in paragraph 3, shifting the
legal descriptions of these properties westward 33 feet.
5. The error was propagated into legal descriptions of adjoining real property, including lot
11 (parcel 1-40-440011) and lot 12 (parcel 1-40-440012) to the East, and lots 57 (parcel
1-40-440057), 52 (parcel 1-40-440052), and 58 (parcel 1-40-440058) to the West of the
former Ivadell Tomlinson estate.
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6. Modifications were subsequently made to the descriptions of lot 57 (parcel 1-40440057), lot 52 (parcel 1-40-440052), and lot 58 (parcel 1-40-440058) which altered the
boundary lines by agreements, surveys, and deed exchanges.
7. Even though the boundaries between lot 16 (parcel 1-40-440016) and lot 57 (parcel 1-40440057) are contiguous, the modifications mentioned in paragraph 6 purported to create a
new parcel of 33 feet in width between lots 16 and 57. This purported parcel is referred
to as lot 59 (parcel 1-40-440059) in the records of the Utah County Recorder.
8. Defendants Maria Angelica Sanchez, Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo claimed an
interest in the 33-foot wide parcel of real property known as lot 59 (parcel 1-40-440059)
in the Utah County Recorder's Office.
9. The Court finds that lot 59 (parcel 1-40-440059), as described in the records of the Utah
County Recorder, does not exist and that the county records are in error.
10. The Court finds that the metes and bounds description prepared by John B. Stahl, of the
disputed parcel (referred to in the Utah County Recorder's Office as lot 59 or parcel 140-440059), in addition to that of lots 13 and 16 (indisputably owned by Plaintiffs),
describes exactly the two lots purchased by Plaintiffs approximately thirty years ago.
11. Therefore, the Court finds that Title should be quieted in Plaintiffs John and Deanna
Sudweeks in real property referred to in paragraph 10 and more particularly described as
follows:
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Commencing at the North Quarter corner of Section 27, Township 5 South,
Range 2 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South 729.55 feet
(South 729.35 feet and 730.08 feet by record and South 00°05'49" East by
Utah County State Plane Coordinate System) along the section line and
North 89°39'57" East 33.00 feet (East 33.0 feet by record) to a point on the
east line of 1500 East Street and the south line of Battle Creek Drive,
Pleasant Grove, Utah; thence continuing along the south line of said Battle
Creek Drive North 89°39f57" East 356.74 feet (North 89°05f East 356.74
feet by record) to the northeast comer of that certain parcel originally
described in Book 1241 at Page 262 as Entry 13592:1971 in the office of the
Utah County Recorder, said northeast comer being the True Point of
Beginning of the herein described parcel; and running thence and continuing
along said south line of Battle Creek Drive North 89°39,57" East 171.24 feet
(North 89 05' East 171.26 feet by record) to the northwest comer of that
certain parcel originally described in Book 672 at Page 511 as Entry
1276:1955 said comer being common with that certain parcel described in a
Quit Claim Deed as Entry 35258:2003 recorded March 10, 2003, said comer
also being South 89°39f57" West 176.74 feet from that certain fence comer
originally described in Book 672 at Page 511 as Entry 1276:1955 and as
described in those certain Boundary Line Agreements recorded in Book
2275 at Page 838 as Entry 1746:1986 and in Book 2966 at Page 465 as
Entry 35388:1992; thence South 00°00'07" East 132.90 feet (South 0°13f
West 132.90 feet by record) along the west line of said parcel originally
described in Book 672 at Page 511 as Entry 1276:1955; thence South
89°01,32" West 153.35 feet (South 89°05' West 171.27 feet by record) to the
southwest comer of said parcel originally described in Book 1241 at Page
262 as Entry 13592:1971, said southwest comer being North 89°01'32"
Eastl 80.02 feet (North 89°05' East 180 feet by record) from the southeast
comer of that certain parcel originally described in Book 679 at Page 617 as
Entry 5772:1955; thence North 00°03f00" East 134.81 feet (North 0°16f East
132.90 feet by record) to the True Point of Beginning.
12. Title to this real property being quieted in the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the issue
boundary by acquiescence is therefore moot.
13. The issue of prescriptive easement is similarly moot.
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14. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claim for forcible detainer should be dismissed based on
Plaintiffs own motion.
15. The Court finds that Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica
Sanchez claimed rightful use of the disputed parcel, and as a result, the Plaintiffs' claim
for trespass should be denied.
16. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo violated the Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction, which were entered by this Court on or about
September 6, 2001, by placing threatening telephone calls to Plaintiffs on or about June
24, 2003 and June 26, 2003.
17. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden with regards to Rule 65A
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, as a result, Defendants Miguel David Gedo and
James Gedo are permanently restrained and enjoined from using, occupying or
trespassing on Plaintiffs real property, including the real property described in paragraph
11, herein, and from having any contact with Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' family members.
18. Plaintiffs incurred $14,182.70 in reasonable attorney fees and costs, as testified to by
Plaintiffs' attorney, Brett C. Anderson of WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C., in the
Affidavit of Brett C. Anderson. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should be awarded $14,182.70
for their attorney fees and costs included herein, and judgment should be entered against
Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo in the amount of $14,182.70.
Based on the above, and for good cause showing,
5

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1. The records of the Utah I utility Rixonki shall he niiTeclal in rnnl'nrmance to the survey
performed by John B. Stahl (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1) to show that lot 59 (parcel 1-40440059) does not exist.
2. Title to the disputed VV ionl vvute parcel of real property - former lot 59 (parcel 1 -40
440059) - is quieted in John and Deanna Sudweeks, as part of the following described
real property:
Commencing at the North Quarter corner of Section 27, Township 5 South,
Range 2 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South 729.55 feet
(South 729.35 feet and 730.08 feet by record and South 00°05'49" East by Utah
County State Plane Coordinate System) along the section line and North
89°39'57" East 33.00 feet (East 33.0 feet by record) to a point on the east line of
1500 East Street and the south line of Battle Creek Drive, Pleasant Grove, Utah;
thence continuing along the south line of said Battle Creek Drive North 89°39,57"
East 356.74 feet (North 89°05f East 356.74 feet by record) to the northeast corner
of that certain parcel originally described in Book 1241 at Page 262 as Entry
13592:1971 in the office of the Utah County Recorder, said northeast corner
being the True Point of Beginning of the herein described parcel; and running
thence and continuing along said south line of Battle Creek Drive North
89°39'57" East 171.24 feet (North 89°05' East 171.26 feet by record) to the
northwest corner of that certain parcel originally described in Book 672 at Page
511 as Entry 1276:1955 said corner being common with that certain parcel
described in a Quit Claim Deed as Entry 35258:2003 recorded March 10, 2003,
said corner also being South 89°39'57ff West 176.74 feet from that certain fence
corner originally described in Book 672 at Page 511 as Entry 1276:1955 and as
described in those certain Boundary Line Agreements recorded in Book 2275 at
Page 838 as Entry 1746:1986 and in Book 2966 at Page 465 as Entry 35388:1992;
thence South 00o00,07" East 132.90 feet (South 0°13' West 132.90 feet by record)
along the west line of said parcel originally described in Book 672 at Page 511 as
Entry 1276:1955; thence South 89°0r32" West 153.35 feet (South 89°05' West
171.27 feet by record) to the southwest corner of said parcel originally described
in Book 1241 at Page 262 as Entry 13592:1971, said southwest corner being
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North 89 o 0r32" Eastl 80.02 feet (North 89°05' East 180 feet by record) from the
southeast comer of that certain parcel originally described in Book 679 at Page
617 as Entry 5772:1955; thence North 00°03'00" East 134.81 feet (North 0°16'
East 132.90 feet by record) to the True Point of Beginning.
3. Plaintiffs John and Deanna Sudweeks own lots 13 (parcel 1-40-440013) and 16 (parcel 140-440016) up to the western boundary of lot 57 (parcel 1-40-440057), more particularly
described in paragraph 2 of this Order.
4. Plaintiffs' claim for forcible detainer is dismissed on Plaintiffs' own motion.
5. Plaintiffs' claim against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria
Angelica Sanchez for trespass is denied.
6. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are permanently restrained and enjoined
from using, entering, occupying, trespassing on, or otherwise interfering with Plaintiffs'
quiet use and enjoyment of their real property, including the real property described in
paragraph 2 of this Order
7. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are permanently restrained and enjoined
from contacting, annoying, harassing, harming, or otherwise communicating directly or
indirectly with Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' family members.
8. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo shall pay Plaintiffs attorney fees and
costs in the amount of $14,182.70.

7

DATED this 5 day of (/M~\

2004.
BY THE COURT:
/S/ JAMES R.TAYLOR
James R. Taylor
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE
To:

James Gedo, Miguel David Gedo, Maria Angelica Sanchez, Johnny Ray O'Connor,
Martha O'Connor; Defendants,

Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Plaintiffs will submit the above and
foregoing ORDER & JUDGMENT to the Fourth District Court in and for Utah County for
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration.

DATED thij?

day of j ^ W

,2004.

WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER AND
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this jlp-ff/ day of ibiyjui
2004,
to the following:
'
(7
Maria Angelica Sanchez
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Miguel David Gedo
PO Box 970002
Orem, Utah 84097
Miguel David Gedo
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84601
James Gedo
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Johnny Ray O'Connor
1640 East Battlecreek Dr.
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Martha Ray O'Connor
1640 East Battlecreek Dr.
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
John and Deanna Sudweeks
1610 East 200 South
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062

Le^al Assistant

Exhibit "G"
Deeds- Geddo

WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO:
Miguel David Gedo
164CJ East 200 South
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062

U T A H COUNTY

Ecnao

FW EQUITY TIILE AGENCY M

WARRANTY DEED
ALANR.STRASBUR6 grantors)
of Pleasant Grove, County of Utah State of UT hereby
Convey and Warrant to
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO
of PJeasant Grove, County of Utah, State of Utah grantee(s)
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration
the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of UTAH,towit:
PARCEL2:

SEE ATTACHEDEXHTBIT "A"

SidweU No. 14:044:0059
Subject to covenants, conditions and restrictions of record.
WITNESS, the hands of said grantors,;, this
Signed in the presence of

ALJANR.STRASBURG
SIpitiOF UTAH
CCfUNTYOFUTAH

of October 1999, A.D.

f>^
)
:ss
)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this

A\nn

RECORDER

1999 Oct 12 9:09 « FEE 16.00 BY SS

day of

1 9 ^ .bv

L^m.IfrbflTflUul^MiAAwt^
rv Public
,Notajry
Public'V
Residing in: £ > # i ^

\jjir

My Commission Expires: j ^ . $«Z0Ol

A RACQUEL HARVARD
mTmPUBUG*STA!Eo(UTAR[
225 EAST 830 SOUTH
OREM.UTAHS4058

COMM.EXR 12-8-200!

J

ExklBIi
1

'A

_
M 109680W 5 2 * 1 *

PARCEL 2
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON SOUTH SIDE OF BATTLE CREEK DRIVE PLEASANT GROVE, UTAH
THENCE NORTH 89 DEG. 59' WEST A L U G THE SECTION LINE 2075 10 FEET AND SOUTH 720 02 FEET
FROM THE NORTI LEAST CORNER OF k c T I O N 27 TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST SALT LAKE
BASE AND MERIDIAN THENCE SOUTH 29* WEST ALONG A RETAINING WALL AND WELL EXTENDED
146 85 FEET, THENCE NORTH 89 DEG J05' EAST 70 J 9 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 14 DEG 44* EAST 119 29
FEET. THENCE SOUTH 89 DEG 55' W&Y'l84 91 FEET, THENCE NORTH 13 EAST 260 FEET, THENCE
NORTH 89 DEG 05' EAST 84 45 FEET JO BEGINNING
ISS A ND EXCEPT INC
COMMENCING AT THE N0 RTHEAST doRNER OF SECTION 27, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST,
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, THENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 2T58" EAST ALONG THE SECTION LINE
1382 51 FEET THENCE NORTH 89 DECa 49'36* WEST ALONG THE ONE-SDCTEENTH SECTION LINE
1386 88 FEET, THENCE NORTH I DEG 45'27" WEST ALONG A FENCE LINE 37 88 FEET, THENCE SOUTH
89 DEG ->4'56" WEST 4">9 15 FEET, tKENCE SOUTH 89 DEG 13'32M WEST ALONG THE .NORTH
BOUNDARY OF PLAT MC" TIMP RIDGE ESTATES 879 J 7 FEET. THENCE NORTH O DEG 05'48M WEST
ALONG THE ONE-QUARTER SECTION LINE 468 22 FEET. THENCE NORTH 88 DEG 32'53" EAST
PARTIALLY ALONG A FENCE LINE 562 53 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 12'46" EAST 132 75 FEET,
THENCE NORTH 89 DEG 29'14' EAST 184 19 FEET, THENCE NORTH 15 DEG 09M6" WEST 119J29 FEET
THENCE NORTH 8 DEG 06'L2W EAST XLONG* A FENCE LINE 148 31 FEET, THENCE NORTH 88 DEG
39' 14" EAST 204 56 FEET, THENCE NORTtf^2 DEG 00' 13" WEST 69 49 FEET. THENCE NORTH 48 DEG
15* EAST 172 00 FEET THENCE NORTH, 64 DEG 45 EAST 405 50 FEET. THENCE NORTH 19 DEG 57'
EAST 73 26 FEET, THENCE NORTH 17 DEG 20'46" WEST_85 20 FEET, THENCE NORTH 42 DEG 46*14"
EAST 304 90 FEET, THENCE NORTH 89 DEG 35'06' FAST ALONG THE SECTION I 1TNF 1045 29 FEET T©
THE POINT OF BEGINNING

ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON A FENCE'cORNER, AT A POINT ON THE BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT
AS RECORDED IN BOOK 2275-OF-848,,SAID POINT BEING SOUTH 89 DEG 35 , 07' WEST 1949 10 FEET
ALONG SECTION LINE AND SOUTH 729 23 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 27,
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, THENCE SOUTH 8 DEG.
06'12" WEST 14831 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE THENCE SOUTH 89 DEG 59*43" WEST 71 61 FEET
ALONG A FENCE LINE. THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 05'19M EAST 146 13 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE,
THENCE NORTH 89 DEG 33 >35M EAST 92 30 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE TO THE POINT OF
BEGINNING
Al SO I ESS AND EXCEPT ING
I
BEGINNING AT A FENCE CORNER Obj THE SOUTH SIDE OF 200 SOUTH STR£ET (BATTLE CREEK
DRIVE), PLEASANT GROVE, UTAH, WHICH POINT IS SOUTH 89°15 I4M WEST ALONG THE SECTION
LINE 2041 40 FEET AND SOUTH 72935 FEET (BASED ON THE UTAH STATE COORDINATE SYSTEM,
CENTRAL ZONE AND DATA PUBLISHED BY THE UTAH COUNTY SURVEYOR AS OF JANUARY 1986)
FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 27, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST, SALT LAKE
BASE AND MERIDIAN. THENCE SOUTH 00 o 0ri9" WEST 137 87 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE AS
DESCRIBED IN A FENCE LINE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT ENTRY NO 35388-92, BOOK 2966, PAGE 465,
THENCE SOUTH 89o2T00" WEST 82 56 F^ETTO A POINT ON A BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT ENTRY
NO 1746-86, BOOK 2275 PAGE 848, THENCE NORTH 00°12'46" WEST ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE
AGREEMENT 8.63 FEET. THENCE SOUTH 88°32'53H WEST CONTINUING ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE
AGREEMENT 0 50 FEET TO A FENCE LINE, THENCE NORTH 00°36'30" WEST 129 53 FEET TO THE
SOUTH SIDE OF SAID 200 SOUTH STREEf, THENCE NORTH 89°33,35M EAST ALONG SAID STREET 84 63
FFET TO THE POINT OF BFGINNING
ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON A BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT ENTRY NO 1746-86 BOOK 2275, PAGE
848, WHICH POINT IS SOUTH 89°35'14" V^EST ALONG THE SECTION LINE 1970 01 FEET AND SOUTH
875 99 FEET (BASED ON THE UTAH STATE COORDINATE SYSTEM. CENTRAL ZONE AND DATA
PUBLISHED BY THE UTAH COUNTY SURVEYOR AS OF JANUARY 1986) FROM THE NORTHEAST
CORNER OF SECTION 27, TOWNSHIP 5 SbUTH, RANGE 2 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN,
THENCE SOUTH 15°09'46" EAST ALONG L\ID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 119 29 FEET THENCE
SOUTH 89 0 29 , I4 ,, WEST CONTINUING A'^QNG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 184 91 FEET,
THENCE NORTH 00°12'46" WEST CONTINUING ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 124 12
FEET. THENCE NORTH 89o22,00M EAST 82.56 FEET TO A FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED IN A FENCE
LINE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT ENTRY NO 35388-92, BOOK 2966, PAGE 465 THENCE SOUTH 00°05' I9"
WEST 8 25 FEET ALONG A TENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED IN SAID BOUNDARY AGREEMENT TO A
FENCE LINE. THENCE NORTH 89°59,43,# EAST 7161 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED
IN SAID BOUNDARY AGREEMENT. TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING
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ACCOMMODATION
File No.
QU t 1
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO,
of Pleasant Grove Ut ih toun1'
to
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
of Pleasant Grove

I AIM HI* Ml
State of Utah

Grantors
hereby QUIT-CLAIMS
Grantees

County oi Utah

State of Utah

for the sura of TEN DOLLARS AND NO CENTS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION
the follow! nq described tract of land m
Utah

Utah County, State

SEL AfJACHED EXHIBIT "A"
WITNESS, the hand of 3did=Sa?anJLQi^this
1999
^^^

COUNTY OF UTAH

I

STATE OF UTAH

j

, SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b
October, 1999, by MIGUEL DAVID GEJ«
instrument,

who duly acknowledge

same.

.1-'

y

day of Oct obi.

Dfl 1 1 8 4 4 3 K 5 2 4 8 W 6 5 5

EXHIBIT

"A H

PARCEL I.
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON A BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT ENTRY NO. 1746-86. BOOK 2275. PAGE
848, WHICH POfNT IS SOUTH 89M5-|4" WEST ALONG THE SECTION LINE 1970.01 FEET AND SOUTH
875.99 FEET (BASED ON THE UTAH STATE COORDINATE SYSTEM. CENTRAL ZONE AND DATA
PUBLISHED BY THE UTAH COUNTY SURVEYOR AS OF JANUARY 1986) FROM THE NORTHEAST
CORNER OF SECTION 27. TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH. RANGE 2 EAST. SALT LAKE BASE AND MERJDUN;
THENCE SOUTH 15*09*46- EAST ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 119.29 FEET; THENCE
SOUTH 89*2914- WEST CONTINUING ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 184.91 FEET;
THENCE NORTH 00*12*46" WEST CONTINUING ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 124.12
FEET. THENCE NORTH 89*22*00" EAST 82.56 FEET TO A FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED TN A FENCE
LINE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT ENTRY NO. 35388-92. BOOK 2966. PAGE 465. THENCE SOUTH 00*05'19"
WEST 8.25 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED IN SAID BOUNDARY AGREEMENT, TO A
FENCE LINE; THENCE NORTH 89*59'43" EAST 71.61 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED,
W SAID BOUNDARY AGREEMENT. TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.

ty+OW-im&t

Exhibit "ir
Summons

BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and
DEANNA SUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMONS

vs.
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and
MARTHA O'CONNOR

Casr No.

Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO: MIGUEL DAVID GEDO
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 70 days of service ot thr,
summons upon you, to iile v, llh the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601,
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney If you fail to do
so, judgment by default will be taken af>auiit upon ioi the relief demanded in said complaint which is on
file with the court.
DATED this W day of May, 20u l
DUVAL HANSEN W i n <fc MORLEY, PC.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
SLR VE DEFEND AN i

BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and
DEANNA SUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMONS

vs.
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and
MARTHA O' CONNOR

Case No.

Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: JAMES GEDO
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this
summons upon you, tofilewith the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601,
a written answer to the attached complaiiit and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney. If you fail to do
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on
file with the court.

.

DATED this U_ day of May, 2001.
DUVAL HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY, P.C.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
SERVE DEFENDANT-

BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and
DEANNA SUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMONS

vs.
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and
MARTHA O'CONNOR

Case No.

Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this
summons upon you, tofilewith the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601,
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintifFs attorney. If you fail to do
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on
file with the court.
DATED thisVT. day of May, 2001
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
SERVE DEFENDANT:

Exhibit "I"
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause

RECEIVED
JUL I 5 im
BRETT C. ANDERSON (8134)
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
306 West Main
American Fork, Utah 84003
TELEPHONE: (801) 756-7658

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and
DEANNA SUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,

;)

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

;

vs.
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, ]1
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR,
1
Defendants.

Civil No. 01-0402488
Judge: District #7

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff John R. Sudweeks' Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The Court has reviewed the motion, and the
affidavit in support thereof, and from the matters submitted, the Court hereby finds:
1.

This dispute appears to be a dispute involving threats made by Defendants Miguel
David Gedo and James Gedo against Plaintiff John R. Sudweeks, his wife and

1

family, and that the threats appear to be threats of imminent physical violence and
death against Mr. Sudweeks, his wife and family.
2.

This dispute also appears to be a dispute involving the blocking of a large
wrecking truck in front of the Plaintiffs' motor home for a period of many days,
which prohibited the Plaintiffs' from the use of their motor home.

3.

That from the parties' pleadings filed in this case, this Court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter as well as personal jurisdiction over the parties.

4.

It appears that on or about 7/2/01, Plaintiff John R. Sudweeks was working in his
back yard at 1610 East 200 South, Pleasant Grove, Utah when he was approached
by Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo (Gedos), and his health and
life were imminently threatened by the Gedos, as well as the health and life of Mr.
Sudweeks' wife and family, and that these threats may be related to the pending
quiet title action which the Plaintiffs have filed against the Gedos and their
mother.

5.

It appears that the Gedos have recently parked a large wrecking truck in front of
the Plaintiffs' motor home which was a few feet away from the Plaintiffs' home,
and that this prohibited the Plaintiffs from the use of their motor home for many
days.

2

6.

It appears, based on the alleged threats and actions of the Gedos which are
described in the Affidavit of John R. Sudweeks in Support of Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order, that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to John R. Sudweeks, his wife, Deanna Sudweeks, and their
immediate family members before the Defendants, Miguel David Gedo and James
Gedo, are heard on this matter.

7.

That it appears that the Defendants, Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo, will not
suffer cost, attorney fees or damage as the result of this injunction, and the Court
therefore dispenses with the requirement of security.

Based upon the above, and good cause appearing, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
8.

Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are temporarily restrained and
enjoined from entering Plaintiffs' real property located at: 1610 East 200 South,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, including the thirty three foot wide parcel which is
described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint in this case, and from
blocking or otherwise interfering with Plaintiffs' quiet use and enjoyment of said
real property, unless and until further order of this Court.

3

9.

Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are further restrained and
enjoined from contacting, annoying, harassing, harming, or otherwise
communicating directly or indirectly with the Plaintiffs and their immediate
family members, unless and until further order of this Court.

DEFENDANTS MIGUEL DAVID GEDO AND JAMES GEDO ARE FURTHER
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED to appear and show cause, if any they have, why this
Temporary Restraining Order should not be converted to a preliminary injunction and continued
during the pendency of this action, on

'{\\)a S[

2001, at the hour of

\Q \ c j Cu^, at the

Fourth District Courthouse, Provo Department, 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah, Room \ j ^ .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that no security is required
for the issuance of this Temporary Restraining Order. The Court will, however, reconsider the
issue of security at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing set forth above.

DATED this ^ 2 / d a y of July, 2001.

//-

*&D $*

BY THE COURT

iAA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <?^raay of July, 2001, a true and correct copy of the within
and foregoing TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was
mailed, via United States Postal Service, first class postage prepaid, to the following:
Miguel David Gedo
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84061
James Gedo
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84061

— ^ 1

ttd&.aJk^
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Exhibit "J"
Order and Preliminary Injunction

Brett C. Anderson, (8134)
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
306 West Main Street
American Fork, Utah 84003
TELEPHONE: (801) 756-7658

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and
DEANNA SUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

;>
;)

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AGAINST
DEFENDANTS MIGUEL DAVID
GEDO AND JAMES GEDO

]

MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
;
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and
]I
MARTHA O'CONNOR.

Civil No. 01-0402488
Judge: Steven L. Hansen

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on August 8, 2001, at 10:15 a.m., before
the Honorable Steven L. Hansen. The Plaintiffs appeared in person and were represented by
Brett C. Anderson of the law firm of DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. Defendants
Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo appeared in person and were not represented by counsel.

1

The Court, having heard arguments of Plaintiffs' counsel and the Defendants, having heard
evidence in support of their pleadings, and having reviewed the file in this matter, and being
otherwise fully advised, enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs, John R. Sudweeks and Deanna Sudweeks will suffer irreparable harm
unless this Order and Injunction issues.

2.

The threatened injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs whatever damage this Order and
Injunction may cause Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo.

3.

This Order and Injunction will not be adverse to the public interest.

4.

Although the Court, with the limited information before it, is unable, at this point,
to find that there is a substantial likelihood that the Plaintiffs will prevail on the
merits of their underlying claim, the case does present serious issues on the merits
which should be the subject of further litigation.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, and the Court, being otherwise fully advised, it is
hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

2

1.

That Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are restrained and enjoined
from entering Plaintiffs' real property located at: 1610 East 200 South, Pleasant
Grove, Utah, including the thirty-three foot wide parcel which is described in
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint which has been filed in this matter,
and which real property is the basis of this law suit, and is referred to by the
Records of the Utah County Recorder as:
COMMENCING South 735.14 Feet and West 2069.64 Feet From
the Northeast Corner of Section 27, Township 5 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; South 0* 3' 13" West .06 feet;
South 0* 3" 14", West .07 Feet; South 89* 33' 35", West 56.38
Feet; South 0* 36' 30 ", East 129.3 Feet; North 88* 32' 53", East .5
Feet; South 0* 12' 47", East .18 Feet; South 88* 32' 52", West
29.43 T; North 0* 12' 47", West 138.01 Feet; North 88* 39' 13",
East 84.45 Feet to the Point of Beginning. Total area is
approximately .101 acres.

2.

Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are restrained and enjoined from
blocking or otherwise interfering with Plaintiffs' quiet use and enjoyment of the
parcels of real property described in Paragraph 1 above.

3.

Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are restrained and enjoined from
contacting, annoying, harassing, harming, or otherwise communicating directly or
indirectly with the Plaintiffs and their family members.

3

4.

That Defendants' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is hereby denied.

DATED this \p

day o£Atigust, 2001.
BY THE COURT

^/Steven L. Hansen
Steven L. Hansen
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this ^ l ^ d a y of August, 2001,1 deposited in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Preliminary Injunction Against
Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo, to:
Miguel David Gedo
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84061
James Gedo
361 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84601

j^.Y^Hb*^

Exhibit "K"
Memorandum Decision-Judge Hansen

2
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHNR. SUDWEEKS, and DEANNA
SUDWEEKS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 010402488
vs.

Date: March 20, 2002

MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, MIGUEL
DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, JOHNNY
RAY O'CONNOR, and MARTHA
O'CONNOR.

Judge Steven L. Hansen

Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants5 Demand to Quash Complaint,
Terminate Injunction, Litigation Fees, and Motion to Strike Defendants' Request for Dismissal
Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees The Court having reviewed all relevant memoranda,
now grants Plaintiffs' Motions.
Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo have submitted to the Court a Demand
to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction, and Award Litigation Fees In addition, Defendants
have submitted a Request for Dismissal Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees. Both pleadings
are hand-written and neither of the pleadings includes a Certificate of Mailing indicating that the
pleadings were properly served on Plaintiffs.
Rule 10(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all pleadings shall be
typewritten or printed and "all typing or printing shall be clearly legible " Rule 10(f) provides that
parties may be required to substitute properly prepared pleadings for nonconforming pleadings.
Additionally, Rule 5(d) provides that papers filed with the court "shall be accompanied by a
certificate of service showing the date and manner of service completed by the person effecting

service." The Court concludes that Defendants' pleadings are illegible. As a result,
understanding the basis of Defendants' arguments is virtually impossible. In addition, no mailing
certificate has been filed with the Defendants' pleadings. Therefore, Defendants' Demand to
Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction, Litigation Fees, and Defendants' Request for Dismissal
Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees are stricken. Defendants' shall submit properly
prepared pleadings.
Plaintiffs' counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the
Court's signature.

DATED this

day of _

JiAstU 1.2002
BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010402488 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

JAMES GEDO
DEFENDANT
3 61 WEST 800 NORTH
PROVO, UT 84601
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO
DEFENDANT
371 East 155 South
Or em UT
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR
DEFENDANT
1640 E Battlecreek Dr
Pleasant Grove UT 84062
MARTHA O'CONNOR
DEFENDANT
1640 E Battlecreek Dr
Pleasant Grove UT 84062
MARIE ANGELICA SANCHEZ
DEFENDANT
371 East 155 South
Orem UT 84061
BRETT C ANDERSON
ATTORNEY PLA
306 West Main Street
American Fork UT 8 4 003

Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this lQ

day of

NAME

20 02-

Wlg/ch

TtoJ ^Afnr.

*te

Deputy Court Clerk

Paqe 1 (last)

Exhibit "L"
Judge Taylor order, Judge Stott order

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, Statg_of Utah
Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEP 2 5 2DB5
John R. Sudweeks, et al.,
Plaintiffs

:
:

ORDER

vs.

:

Date: September 23,2003

Maria Angelica Sanchez, et. al,

:

Case Number: 010402488

:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants

This matter comes before the Court upon the receipt of a pleading titled "Request for
Change of Judge, URCP 63b," filed by the Defendants. The Plaintiff has moved to strike the
request pursuant to Rules 12(f) and 10 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that
the pleading is not in appropriate form and is difficult, if not impossible to read and understand.
The Court agrees that the text of the pleading is difficult to understand. Nevertheless, Rule 63(b)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure is clear and specific. Rule 63(b)(C)(2) states that "The judge
against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an order
granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge." Under
subsection (3)(A) the reviewing judge then determines the timeliness and sufficiency of the
pleading. It is, therefore, ORDERED:
1) the Plaintiffs motion to strike the Defendant's Request for change of Judge is denied.
2) This matter is referred to the Honorable Gary Stott, presiding judge of the Fourth
District Court, to determine the sufficiency of the motion and to act as may be appropriate
Page 1 of

2

pursuant to Rule 63, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 23rd day of September, 2

Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
Brett C. Anderson
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Counsel for the Defendant:
James Gedo (self represented)
Maria Angelica Sanchez (self represented)
Miguel David Gedo (self represented)

Mailed this,<2& day of

, 2003, postage pre-paid as noted above.

KjLSl

Court Clerk

Page 2 of
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Cy-L,
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN R SUDWEEKS and DEANNA
SUD WEEKS,
Plaintiffs,

OCT I ^2003

RULING
CASE NO. 010402488
JUDGE: GARY D STOTT

vs.
MARIA SANCHEZ, MIGUEL DAVID
GEDO, JAMES GEDO, JOHNNY RAY
O'CONNOR, and MARTHA O'CONNOR,
Defendants.

RULING
This Court has received the court file for the above referenced case, in which the matter
has been referred to address the sufficiency of a motion filed by Miguel D. Gedo.
On September 18, 2003, Mr. Gedo filed a document entitled Request for Change of
Judge, URCP 63b. Mr. Gedo is pro se, which shall require this Court to be less inclined to
require Mr. Gedo to fully comply with the rules of procedure than would be expected of counsel.
However, Mr. Gedo, who has chosen to represent himself, must make a reasonable effort to meet
the demands of rules affecting the workings of the courts and the service of judges assigned to
cases therein.
Mr. Gedo's motion or request does not refer to the correct rule to change or disqualify a
judge. Rule 63A URCP does not apply to the Request for Change of Judge. "All parties . . . "
have not joined in the motion as required by that particular provision.
Even if this Court were to assume that the request is intended to rely on Rule 63 URCP,
this defendant has still failed to comply with the requirements of that provision. Based upon the
language contained in the Request, this Court is unable to understand what it is that Mr. Gedo is
complaining of as to Judge Taylor's participation in the case, and in fact, this Court is not able to
understand what is actually being said or asked for in the document.

Therefore, the Courtfindsthat the Request of Motion is deficient as to any information or
which this Court can conclude any impropriety has occurred by Judge Taylor, or anyone else for
that matter. Motion or Request is denied and the case is referred back to Judge Taylor for further
proceedings.
DATED this ^ 7 day of

.
0^1^2003.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010402488 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

a

day of

NAME
JAMES GEDO
DEFENDANT
Miguel David Gedo/Maria
Sanche
768 East 300 North
PROVO, UT 84604
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO
DEFENDANT
P 0 BOX 970002
OREM UT 84097
MARIE ANGELICA SANCHEZ
DEFENDANT
371 East 155 South
Orem UT
BRETT C ANDERSON
ATTORNEY PLA
110 S MAIN
PLEASANT GROVE UT 84062

Oot_

\oC\?.

Deputy Cour
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Exhibit "M"
Proof of proper service upon Miguel David Gedo

BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853
Attorney for Plaintifls
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and
DEANNASUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMONS

vs.
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and
MARTHA O'CONNOR

Case No.

Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO: MIGUEL DAVID GEDO
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this
summons upon you, tofilewith the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601,
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney. If you fail to do
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on
file with the court.

^A.

DATED this W day of May, 2001.
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintifls
SERVE DEFENDANT:

R E T U R N OF S E R V I C E
State of Utah
County of Utah

)
)ss.
)

I hereby make return of service and certify:
1.

I am a person over the age of 21 years; and

2.

I served this subpoena upon the following witness listed herein at the
address described herein by showing the original subpoena to the
witness personally, informing the witness of its contents and delivering
to the witness a copy of this subpoena.
Subpoena served on:
Date of service:
Time of Service:

5~"—/S
Q^

;

0/

3rt
-r?

TSL

Officer's Signature
INSTRUCTIONS TO WITNESS
To receive payment of your witness fee (1) bring this subpoena with you to court,
(2) present the subpoena to the clerk of the court, (3) sign the witness fee book and
payment will be issued upon proof of identification.

Date/Time subpoena was unable to be served:
Reason officer was unable to serve subpoena:

BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and
DEANNASUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMONS

vs.
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and
MARTHA O' CONNOR

Case No.

Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO: JAMES GEDO
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this
summons upon you, tofilewith the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601,
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney. If you fail to do
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on
file with the court.

.

DATED this U_ day of May, 2001.
DUVAL HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY, P.C.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
SERVE DEFENDANT:

R E T U R N OF S E R V I C E
State of Utah
County of Utah

)
)ss.
)

I hereby make return of service and certify:
1.

I am a person over the age of 21 years; and

2.

I served this subpoena upon the following witness listed heron at the
address described herein by showing the original subpoena to the
witness personally, informing the witness of its contents and delivering
to the witness a copy of this subpoena.
Subpoena served on:
Date of service:
Time of Service:

!£»,<*
-^fi**e<; <£jl>
KJ=?*Z£*0
^

CA?^J
\ y /,'eu

*~r<9~~ y/
OP~^<r

Officer's Signature
INSTRUCTIONS TO WITNESS
To receive payment of your witness fee (1) bring this subpoena with you to court,
(2) present the subpoena to the cleric of the court, (3) sign the witness fee book and
payment will be issued upon proof of identification

Date/Time subpoena was unable to be served:
Reason officer was unable to serve subpoena:

**M«)

BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601

JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and
DEANNASUDWEEKS,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMONS

vs.
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ,
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO,
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and
MARTHA O' CONNOR

Case No.

Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this
summons upon you, to file with the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601,
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney. If you fail to do
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on
file with the court.
DATED this V7_ day of May, 2001
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.

BRETT C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
SERVE DEFENDANT:

R E T U R N OF S E R V I C E
State of Utah

)

County of Utah

)

I hereby make return of service and certify:
1.

I am a person over the age of 21 years; and

2.

I served this subpoena upon the following witness listed herein at the
address described heron by showing the original subpoena to the
witness personally, informing the witness of its contents and ddivering
to the witness a copy of this subpoena.
Subpoena served on: / ^ W ^ .
Date of service:
Time of Service:

—>«* <dr* *»

C/^fr* '

S^ ~' ffr ~Of
09-30

Officer's Signature
INSTRUCHONS TO WITNESS
To receive payment of your witness fee (1) bring this subpoena with you to court,
(2) present the subpoena to the clerk of the court, (3) sign the witness fee book and
payment will be issued upon proof of identification.

Date/Time subpoena was unable to be served:
Reason officer was unable to serve subpoena:

So/
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Exhibit "N"
Notice of ex parte Communication

/ft *

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN R SUDWEEKS and DEANNA
SUD WEEKS,
Petitioner/Plaintiff(s),

NOTICE RE: EX PARTE
COMMUNICATION

vs.

Case #010402488

MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, MIGUEL
DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, JOHNNY
RAY O'CONNOR, and MARTHA
O'CONNOR,
Respondent/Defendant(s).

Judge Steven L. Hansen
Division 7

THE COURT notes to the litigants in the above-entitled matter that it has received the
attached letter from the defendants, Miguel and James Gedo. The documents are an ex parte
communication with the Court and may not be considered by the Court unless resubmitted in
compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the Court is prohibited under the law
from giving legal advice to the defendants. The subject documents have been unread and filed in
the court file.

<^a££$i

Dated this November 21, 2001

STEVEN L. HANSEN
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010402488 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

^-1

day of

^/W

NAME
JAMES GEDO
DEFENDANT
361 WEST 800 NORTH
PROVO, UT 84601
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO
DEFENDANT
371 East 155 South
Orem UT
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR
DEFENDANT
1640 E Battlecreek Dr
Pleasant Grove UT
MARTHA O'CONNOR
DEFENDANT
1640 E Battlecreek Dr
Pleasant Grove UT
MARIE ANGELICA SANCHEZ
DEFENDANT
371 East 155 South
Orem UT
BRETT C ANDERSON
ATTORNEY PLA
306 West Main Street
American Fork UT 84003
GORDON DUVAL
ATTORNEY PLA
110 SOUTH MAIN STREET
PLEASANT GROVE UT 84 062
20 0\

t^%mif^-^
Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

v.
Civil No.
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Exhibit "O'
Deeds to Sudweeks
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w no

TrUf 1 ABSTRACT 0 t

'IRRANTY DEED

, grantor s

JOSEPH BEST AND ELAINE P. BEST, h i s wife
of

Provo

$ County of

Utah

, State of Utah,

hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to JOHN SUDWEEKS AND DEANNA SUDWEEKS, h i s wife
as j o i n t tenants and not a s tenants i n common with f u l l r i g h t s of suvivorship.

, grantee
of

Provo

, County of

Utah

f

state of Utah

for the sum of Ten d o l l a r s and other good and valuable considerations

the following described tract of land in

t 3
- 2

Utah

s

DOLLARS,

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

Commencing a t a point on a fence l i n e on the South side of Battle Creek
Drive. Pleasant Grove, Utah, which point i s North 89°59f West along
the section l i n e 2252.53 feet and South 722.91 feet and North 89°05' East
7.00 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 27, Township 5 South. Range
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: thence South 0°12' West 132.90 feetthence South B9°05! West 85.38 feet; thence North 0°16' East 132.90 f e e t :
thence North 89°05' East 85.26 tfeet t o the place of beginning.
Subject t o easements and r e s t r i c t i o n s of record.

WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this

p.fi

day of

Signed in the presence of

J «^vw-c

, 19 "?2„

y^t^^i^^/L^^^A^L^L
^ ^ ^ ^ U J ^ ^ . . . ^ ^ . ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^

,,MMi>

—

M; fjjtftah

'

\ ss.
J

v*%fi£y. 2 1 s t
day of
June
pelfi^afflgWj^ared before me Joseph Best and Elaine P. Best, h i s wife
the signers
same.

, 1972

of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ** he y executed the
/ /
/ /
/y
^
1

My commission expires ..9.-2A.-73

Residing in

Notary Public.
ErJ?v_o .•-.JJ£a.tl

*
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VHE»5RECORDED,! MAIL TO:

*rfgrt
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WARRANTY

DEED

!
, grantors

*CYD K. CCLLIN \ ; /oiD ^ . X K L D I N S L. C0LLIKG5, K b wiry

of

rve-

t

County of

m

, State of Utah,

ah

hereby CONVEY and WARRANT
to ,;0!1!< P.. SrDWi^hS AND DJAK! A L. S; J 7A T EEKS,
w i f e , as j o i n t t y r a n t s v/itl ru"» • r i j l . t s of s w i ^ o r s h i p in each an i n e t a s
t e n a n t s i n coirxor.

his

, grantee s
of

Ore?

for the sum of

> County of
fer D o l l a r s a r u e t h e r

the following described tract of land in

vtah

, State of Utah

jcc-i c.no V u l ' u V e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

J

Jt:ih

DOLLARS,

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

b e g i n n i n g at a j : o i n t on a f e n c e l i n e en t h e South s i d e of 3 a t t J e Creek D r i v e ,
P l e a s a n t Grove, Utah, which r . c i n t i s Korth S ? c 5 9 ' West along t h e S e c t i o n
l i n o 2252,53 f e e t and South 722.93 f e e t and K o r t h 89 c Q5 f East 7.CO f e e t from
t h e K o r t h e a s t c o r n e r of S e c t i o n 2 7 , Township 5 S o u t h , Ran-e 2 E a s t , S a l t Lake
Base and M e r i i i a n ; t h e n c e N o r t h 8 9 ° O y ^ a s t a l o n g a fence on t h e South s i d e of
s a i d d r i v e 8 6 . 0 0 f e e t : t h e n c e Scat!, ; ^ 1 3 ' West 132.90 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 8 9 ^ 0 5 '
-vest 8 6 . 0 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e North C 0 T ? ' i ^ t 132.90 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t c f b e g i n n i n g .

object

U

e a s o i r e n t s and r e s t r i c t i o n s of

WITNESS the hand

of said grantor , this

record.

C 5t ^

day of

.';guct

, 19

^^y^..^A...,^^du^^..

Signed in the presence of

C^&£&&& $C <*zt&XZ2&&
..y:
STATE OF UTAH,
County of

UTM1

Qn'tfce,
2 r ;th
persoilKDy*.«^)eared before me

day of
Augurt
,1972
PQYD V. COLLLVGS AND G r ^ L n ] ; ; ; , i . COLLTK^S. h i s wife

th^WgWer^V m the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me tha^
same.-6- ^ j
/ / /

f

he;' executec(Hhe

O

Notary i^wic.
My commission expires

y-^jyi

APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION
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Exhibit "P"
O'Conner deed
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WARRANTY DEED
Return To:.
Cnmtet: , J J 4 P * S t

200 S o ^ h

Pleasant Grove. Utah_-B4I&2,

v.
»*

SUSAN S. HARDIN6ER
Pleasant Grove

, County of

grantor
. Swte of Utah hereby

Utah

CONV'iY AND WARRANT to

JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR AND MARTHA J. G'fWNOR, HUSBAND AND WIFE
AS JOINT TENANTS

grantee
for the sum of

TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE C0NSIDERATI0NCounty.

Utah

the following described rracr of land in
F?ate of Utsh:

See Exhibit "A"

WITNESS, the hand

of »klerar.:«u

Jay of

. t'r.U
. A.D. 19

August

/

94

A/A,

Signed in the Presence of

d^Q2dlJM&J_

Mjsanb. fi^rdinger

o

STATE OF UTAH.
County of Utah
On the
/ O ^
pervmally appeared before me
the jifnet

of th<

. A.D. 19 94

<t>yof
August
Susan S. Hardinger
to me that $he

executed the same.

Notary Public
My conuimjicn expires

Residing i n .

^ptwf>
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h«

BSGISjyiNQ a t a f<ipgffl e o g n a r on t h e South a i d e of 200 South S t r e e t
( B a t t l e Creek D r i v e ) , P l e a s a n t Grove, Utah, which p o i n t i e South
89 d e g r e e s 3 5 ' 1 4 " West a l o n g t h e S e c t i o n l i n e 2 0 4 1 . 4 0 f e a t and
S o u t h 729_^3JL,feet ( b a s e d on t h e Utah S t a t e C o o r d i n a t e S y s t e m ,
C e n t r a l Son© and Data p u b l i s h e d by t h e Utah County S u r v e y o r a s of
J a n u a r y 1986) from t h e N o r t h e a s t Corner of S e c t i o n 2 7 , Township 5
S o u t h , Range 2 2!ast, S a l t Lake Baste and M e r i d i a n ; t h e n c e South 00
d e g r e e s 0 5 * 1 9 teat 1 3 7 . 8 7 f e e t alon^f a f e n c e l i n e as d e s c r i b e d i n
q_7gnc_e liii>^__Sojindary Agreement Rntry^No. 353 8 8 - 9 2 , Book 2 9 6 6 , ..
JPag&__4£5^ t h * : ^o~^outh 89 d e g r e e s 2 2 ' <FGir~*iavt 8 2 . 5 6 f e e t t o a
p o i n t on a Boundary L i n * Agxaauout Entry No. _XX4JLr-&6, Book 2^75,
Pag© 8 4 8 ; t h e n c o N o r t h 00 d e g r e e s 1 2 ' 4 6 " Heat .along s a i d B o u M a r y
^ a ^ _ A g r e e m o j a t 2lSJL_l«3iu) t h e n c e S o u t h 88 dagrej8o_J^'J53 B Woat
c o n t i n u i n g a l o j a § ^ ^ i d r ^ o u n d a r y L i n e Agreement ]j). SOjfftej t o _a f .QBCJB
l l m a j t h e n c e N o r t h 00 d e g r e e s 3 6 ' 3 0 " We•J^JJiTSTT'lPg.etj^o the~"3outli
c i d c T o ^ s a i d 200 S o u t h S t r e e t ; t h e n c e North 89 degree© 3 3 ' 3 5 " 2 a s t
a l o n g o a i d s t r e e t fP4 . 68 f e e t ) to_ th<s point^of_-bflginiiiiigL.
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Exhibit "Q"
Other county plat maps—"ghost parcel"
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